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ABSTRACT
This paper summarizes and critically evaluates what is known
about postwar trends in both the level and distribution of economic
well—being. Although certain non—income aspects of well—being
are considered, the primary focus is on the level and inequality of
income. Considerable attention is paid to recent controversies
over the effects of transfers in kind and changing life—cycle income
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"The more things change, the more they remain the same."
--Anon
I.Introduction and Preview
The ultimate purpose of an economy, it may fairly be
said, is to enhance the material well-being of its people.
In the philosophical pecking order, such a crass and narrow
..goal may not appear as lofty as, let us say, inner peace
and spiritual uplift. But, as has oft been remarked, it
is difficult to feed the soul while the stomach is empty.
Because of the absolutely central position of the task
of producing more and better goods, and distributing them
equitably (what a loaded word that is!) among the citizenry,
the topics of the other chapters in this book may justifiably
be considered subservient to this one. Changes in the financial
system, in taxation and public expenditure, in the structure
of industry, in international economic relations, and so on,
are all most naturally appraised by asking how much they
contribute to economic well-being. Thus this chapter may,
without stretching the imagination too far, be thought of
as the ttoutputsti produced by the other chapters' "inputs."
At least this is the preeminence I claim for my topic.
How well has the U.S. economy performed the two central
tasks of raising living standards and enhancing economic
equality during the postwar period: The basic story is2.
simple enough to summarize in a few words, though complex
enough to require volumes for a complete account. Where
the average leve. of economic well-being is concerned, the
record is one of steady ioveme Not an unblemished
record to be sure, and not as spectacular a record as the
postwar "economic miracles" of Germany and Japan, but a
creditable record nonetheless.
However, when we turn to consider the J.sibution
of economic welfare--economic equality, as it is commonly
called--the central stylized fact is one of constaçy. As
measured in the official data, income inequality was just
about the same in 1977 (the last year for which data were
availablewhen this was written) as it was in l91.7. Though
this seems a straightforward conclusion, itactuallyconceals
ahost of controversies and puzzles. For the stability we
observe in the income distribution is not the result of a
boring, static economy, nor the result of some "natural
economiclaw," asPareto (1897) thought. Rather it is the
result of a confluence of powerful forces, some pulling toward
greater equality and some pulling toward greater inequality,
which together produced a great underwater swirl while
causing barely a ripple on the surface.
Forexample, the American population experienced
substantial demographic changes during this 30-yearperiod.
The causes of these changes were varied, complex, in part5.
obvious and in part obscure, but in any case well beyond
the scope of this chapter.1 What matters for our purposes
is that, given the way income distribution data are compiled,
t1se demographic shifts would have produced a substantial
trend toward greater inequality had not other factors inter-
vened. It will not be giving away the plot to suggest that
government transfer programs played a major role in that
intervention.
Even the basic stylized fact that income inequality
has remained constant since World War II has not gone unchallenged.
It has been argued, for example, that if we measured income
more comprehensively than we do, or if we measured it over
periods longer than a year, a clearer trend toward equality
would emerge. As we shall see, seemingly mundane issues
like how to define and measure income are of considerable
importance in appraising the economy's postwar performance;
and they also raise some surprisingly profound (and perhaps
insoluble) issues.
Since this chapter is a long one, it will be useful
to provide a reader's guide at the outset. Section 2
disposes briefly of some preliminary issues of measurement- -
themeasurement of welfare, the measurement of income, and
the measurement of inequality. The next two sections, which
comprise the bulk of the paper, address the two central topics
of the chapter--postwar trends in the yJ of income (Section
)andits (Section 14.).Section14., in particular,
examines in some depth the controversies alluded to just above.1eV.
Sectionthen takes up several peripheral aspects of the
distribution of income which seem to be of special interest--
poverty, black/white income differentials, and male/female
income differentials. Finally, in Section 6, the myopic
concentration on income is remedied by examining
postwar developments in non-income aspects of well-being
such as leisure, wealth, health, and so on. Section 7
offers some brief concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries
A. From the Sublime to the Ridiculous
The essay begins with a strategic retreat which moves
farther and farther from a concept that is interesting but
unmeasurable (welfare) and closer and closer to a concept that
is measureable but possibly uninteresting (money income as
defined by the Census Bureau). Like most strategic retreats,
this one does accomplish something. But it must be admitted
that its direction is dictated more by expedience than by
principle. The retreat takes place in several stages.
The first step is to admit that man does not live on
bread alone. Political freedom, peace, inner tranquility,
a happy family life, and so on may be far more important to
many people than the bill of goods and services they consume.
Still, it would be the height of folly for an economist to
write an essay on these more ephemeral aspects of human welfare.5.
On grounds of comparative advantage, therefore, I will for
the most part restrict my attention to what is normally
considered flQj well-being.
The second step is to concede that there is little
scientific basis for deciding how much "utility" any specific
individual gets at any particular time, and even less for
deciding whether Laurel gets more or less than Hardy. Two
avenues therefore remain open. We can look at levels and
distributions of items which are presumed to yield utility,
such as consumptiongoods and leisure time. Or we can look
at peoples' opportunities, as summarized by their endowments
and the prices they face, on the assumption that people
with more generous opportunities achieve correspondingly
higher levels of satisfaction.2
While part of our army will stop to fight the battle
here, most of it will retreat one step more--to the use of
current income to summarize the whole opportunity set. Now
we know this is not quite right. Two individuals with
identical opportunities will have different incomes if their
preferences differ.3 Ill health may mean that more current
income is necessary to achieve any given level of satisfaction,
or alarge store ofaccumulated wealth may mean that less is
necessary.While severalof these qualifications will be
dealtwith in what follows, the data dictate that the analysis
beconducted mainly in terms of income.6.
B.The Measurement of Income
Perhaps the worst news is saved for last. The only
reasonably consistent time series of income distributions
covering a long period comes from the annual Current
Population Survey (cPS), which uses an income definition
that is far from the economist's (or anyone else's) ideal.1
Economists define an individual's income as the amount he
could consume without depleting his wealth--the sum of his
expenditures plus any increase in his wealth. What does
the CPS offer us? Basically, a distribution of money income
in which some sources of income are grossly underreported,
capital gains are excluded, cash transfers are included but
transfers in kind are excluded, and from which no deduction
is made for income and payroll taxes. Measured income thus
falls far short of the ideal concept of income. Given the
wide cleavage that already exists between well-being and
even this idealconcept ofincome, one might well wonder if
our data do not leave us with a grin without a cat.I
proceed nonetheless in this essay to analyze the grin.
However,some time will be spent in Section 1tquestioning
whether a better measure of income might tell a different
story about postwar trends in income inequality.
Our interest in the level and distribution of income
clearly is motivated by a belief that we can use these two
numbers as approximate indicators of economic welfare.
Specifically, we would like to believe that higher or more7.
equally distributed incomes mean that society is "better off."
Having decided, for lack of a superior alternative, to use
census money income, the next step is to decide on the
recipient unit. Whose incomes shall we study?
This question, which may seem foolish and "academic"
at first, is in fact very important because of the demographic
changes mentioned earlier. For it appears that one of the
items that Americans have purchased with their postwar
prosperity has been the privilege of living apart from their
relatives. Think what happens, for example, when higher
living standards and/or more generous public transfer programs
enable junior, or grandma and grandpa, to move into an
apartment of their own. A new economic unit is formed,
with a rather li income, thus bringing down the average
level of income and raising its inequality. Both economic
indicators will therefore signal a deterioration in welfare,
though we may presume that these changes in living arrangements
actually make the parties involved better off.5
We, therefore, must exercise extreme caution in inter-
preting postwar trends in income distribution. The Census
Bureau offers separate income distributions for
("a group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage,
or adoption and residing together") and for ated
individuals, as well as a oled distribution that combines
both types of units. In this essay, we will pay attention8.
toeach of these distributions, and to the interrelationships
among them.
Further perplexities enter when we ask another question:
why should we be interested in distributions of incomes
instead of incomes measured over some alternative accounting
period? One answer is straightforward and prosaic: that's
the way the data come. But a deeper answer is not so easily
obtained. If we could measure income over any accounting
period we wished, what accounting period would be best?
It seems clear that periods like a day or a week are
far too short to generate meaningful data on income inequality.
All of us have weeks of zero income (at least on a cash
accounting basis), without being "poor" in any real sense.
So longer periods are necessary. But why stop at a year?
Clearly a year is far too short an accounting period to place
many people meaningfully within the income distribution.
For example, since investment in human capital typically
leads to rising age-earnings profiles, many people who are
quite well off in a lifetime sense may appear quite "poor"
during certain years. For these and other reasons many
economists, including myself (Blinder, l97, 1976), have
been attracted to the distribution of pe incomes,
though even this choice is not unobjectionable.
As we shall see, there is evidence that income distributions
over multi-year accounting periods display less inequality
than income distributions for a single year. More importantly,
there is reason to believe that a stronger trend toward9.
equality might emerge ifsomehowwe were able to measure
the distributionof lifetime income.
C. The Measurement of Ineguaij6
Thereare many ways to measure how "equal" or "unequal"
any given distribution of income 5;butthe availability
ofdata dictates that we concentrate on two. The first is
straightforward and requires no elaboration: we can examine
trends in the shares of total income accruing to specific
income groups such as the poorest fifth, the richest fifth,
etc. The second is something called the iatj, and
requires some explanation.7
Income distributions are typically displayed in a
convenient graphical device invented by M.0. Lorenz (1905);
two such oren are depicted in Figure 1. To construct
a Lorenz curve, begin with a square whose dimensions represent
l00/° .Alongthe horizontal axis, measure the cumulative
percentage of consumer units, starting from the poorest;
along the vertical axis, measure the cumulative share of
income received by these units. Data on income shares then
appear as points within the square, and the curvilinear line
connecting them is the Lorenz curve.
Every Lorenz curve has four basic properties:
1.It must begin at the origin, since zero units
have zero income.
2.It must end at the upper-right corner of the
diagram since 100% of the units must receive all the income.
3.If incomes were distributed equally, the Lorenz
curve would be a diagonal line connecting these two points,Jo fFamily
Income
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since the "poorest't 207° of units would receive 20% of the
income, the "poorest" 1O% would receive li0io,andso on.
.Ina real economy, in which significant income
differentials exist, the Lorenz curve will "sag" downward
from this diagonal line representing perfect equality. The
reason is straightforward. If there is any inequality at
all, the poorest 20% of units must receive less than 20/°
of the income, the poorest Ii.0% must receive less than
and so on.
Lorenz curves are useful in depicting inequality because
curves that lie to the diagonal represent distributions
with s inequality. This is also illustrated in Figure 1
which shows, for the family income distribution, the most
equal and most unequal distributions during the entire postwar
period. (The fact that they are so close together illustrates
the aforementioned stability of the income distribution.)
In fact, the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal
(shaded in Figure 1), expressed as a fraction of the area
beneath the diagonal,8 is often used asa summary measure of
inequality. This fraction is called the Giiratio, after
itsinventor Corrado Gini (1936), and it is clear that higher
Gini ratios connote greater inequality.
Since Gini ratios appear so frequently in this essay,
aword ontheir interpretation is in order. The Gini ratioii.
is a purely mechanical measure of inequality, while our
interest in inequality is as an indicator of social welfare.
Suppose in comparing two income distributions we find that
distribution A assigns less income to the poorest 20'°
of families andtothe richest 20 than does distribution B.
(Distribution A naturally has to assign more income to the
middle 60/° of families.) Which distribution has more
"equality"? Clearly A is more equal attheupper tail (the
richare not quite so rich), but B is more equal at the lower
tail (the poor are not quite so poor). But which distribution
is "better"? It is clear that the answer is unclear. It
dependson whether society attaches more importance to income
differences at the high or low end of the income distribution.
But the Gini ratio (or, for that matter, any summary statistic)
tolerates no such ambiguity. It will state for example,
that the Gini ratio for distribution A is .36 while that for
distribution B is .37. For this reasor, we must take care in
pronouncing distributions with lower Gini ratios as "better."
There is, however, one important circumstance in which
the Gini ratio can be relied upon to properly rank different
income distributions. This is the case where the Lorenz
curves do not cross (as in Figure 1), for then
the more unequal distribution will always get the higher Gini
ratio. The conclusion then is this. WhenLorenzcurves
cross, the Gini ratio may rank income distributions incorrectly,12.
and thus cannot be taken very seriously. However, when Lorenz
curves do not cross, such misrankings cannot occur and the
Gini ratio provides useful information. Fortunately for us,
most of the inequality comparisons we have to make are between
Lorenz curves that do not cross.9
_nd si Level of Incorneand Cons ut ion
I turn now to the first of the two major concerns of
this chapter: what has happened to the average level of
economic well-being in the United States since World War II?
As noted earlier, I will at first stealthily translate this
question to: what has happened to the average level of
postponing the consideration of non-income aspects of well-
being to Section 6.
The basic story is, of course, extremely well known.
The postwar U.S. economy has generally produced growth of
per capita incomes, though that growth has been punctuated
by periodic recessions.1° This stylized fact is illustrated
in Figure 2, which charts the behavior of real disposable
income per capita from 1914.7 to 1978. The trend in consumption,
naturally enough, has followed the trend in income rather
closely. But the aggregate data conceal some dramatic changes
in patterns of consumption.
___ 7J3.U.
Many serious shortcomings of Census income were
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the of income, we need no restrict ourselves to Census
income since much better measures are available in the national
income accounts (Nm).
The NTh concept that comes closest to Census income
is Personal Income (p1). And it is easy to remedy several
problems with Census income by supplementing P1 with other NIA
data. First, as a crude way of accounting for (a smoothed
versionof) capital gains, we can add corporate retained
earnings to personal income. Second, we can put P1 on a more
consistentpost-transfer but pre-tax basis (like Census income)
by including not only the employee's share of the payroll tax
but also the employer's share. Making both these changes in
the N data leads me to an income concept that I call
aat_aaacQa1
Amore fundamental problem with Census income, however,
is the illogic of adding in transfers but failing to deduct
the taxes that pay for them. This is easily remedied in the
aggregate data by deducing both personal income taxes and
payroll taxes (both shares) from augmented personal income to
arrive at an income concept that I call Augrnented Disposable
Income.
12
The decade-by-decade annual growth rates in real Census
income, real augmented personal income,, and real augmented
disposable income1 are presented in Table 1. Not surprisingly,
for the postwar period as a whole the growth rates of Census
income and augmented personal income are almost identical,
while the growth rate of real augmented disposable income isTable 1
Annualized Grcr.'th Rates in Real
Income Per FamilyandPer Unrelated
Individual, By ThreeDifferentDefinitions
_ca_acQi____.uentedPI°_AugpentedDl°_ _ai1Jfl. _aJ
197-1977 2.22% 2.1'°2.25 2.17% 1.92% i.81i/O
19'17-1957 1.83 1.00 2.18 1.35 1.97 l.]J.
197-l967 3.01 2.71 3.01 2.72 2.68 2.39
197-l977 1.81. 2.72 l,6 2.1 1.11 1.98
:Computed by the author from data in Current Pppulation Rpp, SeriesP-GO,No.11 July 1979 and Thac9TtQatft atP1 and 2ugIientedDI are dcfined inthetext. It was
assuredthat each o theseaggretes wasdividedbetween




about one-third of a percentage point less. Compounded over
50 years, these figures mean that from 1914.7 to 1977 real
augmented P1 per family increased 95% ,whilereal augmented
DI per family increased 77% .Thegap is accounted for by
an increasing burden of personal taxation (with, presumably,
a corresponding increase in public services).
When we break the 50-year period down into decades,
the close agreement between Census income and augmented
personal income starts to melt away. More importantly, a
striking difference between the postwar economic progress of
families and unrelated individuals (Uls) emerges. For both
groups, and for any of the income measures, the middle decade
(which was dominated by the long boom of the .l960s) exhibited
the strongest growth. But the rankings of the other two decades
is reversed. Apparently, families fared much better than Uls
between 1914.7 and 1957, while tJIs fared much better than
families during the most recent decade. Why? The reasons
are to be found in the demographic shifts summarized in
Tables 2 and 5. These tables show that while demographic
changes during 1914.7-1957 were mostly minor for families, Uls
become more likely to be female or elderly. By contrast,
during the last decade Uls became much less likely to be
female, while more families became female-headed. (Both
groups became younger on average.)Table 2
Selected Changes in Family Structure,
1914.7-1977
Characteristic 19J.7.. 195 1911
Averagenumber of:
Persons 3.611W 3.65 3.67 3•33
Children 1.19 1.37 1.111 1.10
Earners NA NA 1.67 1.66
Percent headed by:
Male 90.0 90.6 89.3 8..6
Female 10.0 9.li. 10.7 111..14.
Percenthaving:
2 members 30.6 32.1 33.9 38.5
3 members 25.2 21.5 20.6 22.1
ILmembers 20.1 20.519.0 20.6
5 members 11.1; 12.6 12.5 11.0
6 or more members 12.7 13.14- 114..0 7.9
Percent headed by person:
Age li.1.-214. 5.0 5.2 6.3 6.7
Age 25-314. 22.8 22.1 19.7 23.5
Age -6k 60.7 59.8 59.8 55.
Age6 and over 11.5 12.9 111.2 114..Zj.
Percent on Farms 17.5 11.0 5.li. 3.8
118, Series Source Current_Population_Reoot, Series P-60, No.
P-20, Nos. 21, 20 and Technical Paper 17.Selected Demographic Changes among Unrelated
Individua is, 19k7 -1977
t
Table 3
Percentag 197 191 1967 1977
Male 115.1 39.1 36.9 113.3
Female 511.9 60.9 63,1 56.7
Who AreEarners 65.5 67.2 61.8 63.7
Age lli.-2k 10.1 • 9.3 11.6 17.8
Age 25-311. 13.0 11.8 9.3 19.7
Age 35-6k 116.5 145.8 11.0.5 30.8
Age 6 and over 30.11 33.0 38.6 31.7
Living on Farms 11.8 6.2 2.6 1.7
Source: Current Po ou lation Re o orts,
and Technicai Paoer No. 17.
Series P-60,Nos. 5, 30, 59 nd1.
Where Did It Come_From?
Naturally, all the components of personal income
participated in the postwar growth, though certainly not
equally. Table 1i.showsthat wages, interest, and transfers
accounted for greater shares of augmented personal income in
1977 than was true in 1911.7, whereas proprietor's income, rents,
11;. and corporate profits accounted for smaller shares.
Where_Did It Go?
The concept of augmented personal income as defined
here can be div±ded into three principal uses:
1. spending: the sum of personal consumption
expenditures, interest paid to businesses, and transfers to
foreigners, indirect taxes;
2. saving: personal saving as in the NL2lus
retainedearnings
3. taxes: personal taxes as in the NTh pJs
contributions for social insurance plus indirect taxes. (This
can beviewed as purchases of public consumption.)
Using this three-way split, Table 5showsthat spending
has commanded a dwindling share and taxes have commanded an
expanding share during the postwar period. The share of
savings exhibits no trend, though saving rates were unusually
low in three of the last four years. Closer inspection of
these data reveals that the share of consumption stabilized
between 62 and 63% around 1966, or so, and the share of taxes
stabilized near 30 percent around 1968 .Thussince 1968Table Zi
Sources of Augmented Personal
Incone, 1917-l9TT
Percentage Share of:
a Proprietor's Corporatbe __a.2__ t
Postwar
Average 67.6 10.9 2.7 5.7 5.6 7.5
197 611.5 17.9 2.6 5.5 5.9
1957 68.7 12.0 3.3 5.5 5.8
1967 67.7 8.7 2.8 6. 6.7 7.5
1977 67.7 5.9 1.1 8.3 .5 12.2
Source: National income accounts.
acompensation of employees
bCOrp3r3tCprofits(withinventoryvaluation adjustment and
capital consumption adjustment) minus corporate tax liabilities.
This is equal to the sum of dividends and retained earnings.Table 5





Source: National income accounts.
apersonal outlays less indirect taxes -
savings plus retained earnings





19]4.7 72.11 11.7 22.8
1957 66.7 8.0 25.11.
1967 62.2 9.7 28.1
1977 62.9 5.7 31.316.
American consumers have paid about 30 percent of their gross
incomes to the tax collector, saved about 7 percent, and
spent the remaining 63 percent.
B.Pa tterns of Cons upion., 191i 7-19.11
So income and consumption have grown mightily over the
postwar period. How have American consumers spent this
largesse? An examination of postwar changes in consumption
patterns is interesting for the profile it draws of the
American way of life. And it also holds a few surprises.
A logical place to start is with changes in budget shares.
What fraction of each dollar of consumer spending was spent
on various items in 1914.7 and 1977? Which items commanded an
increasing share of the consumer's budget and which a decreasing
share?
Table 6 contains some answers; but there are too many
numbersin this table for itto "speak for itself, and many
othershidden in the data that underlie it. Letussee what
story these data tell.
At the coarsest level of aggregation, the table shows
justabout what we expect. Americans are now spending more
of their budgets on housing, medical care, private transportation,
recreation, and personal services than they were in 1911.7.
At the same time, they are spending less on food, clothing,
and public transportation. But if we peer a bit below the
surface, some fascinating details emerge..Labje b






































































































































S0L'rc:Co'ptcd bj author frnir c-t2
and Surveof
July1979. -
1Incirestobacco and alcoholic beverages 2il.shoes, accessories, and jewelry
MD3t1costs of purchasing, ma in inir, and operating Dutomobiles
Inc1ues expenditures abroad by U.S. residents Radic a.-id television receivers, recorcs, and musical instruments
6whee I goods, toys, sports equipneri,t, boats, and pleasure aircraft. Inclas both durables and nondurables.
tFor ndica1 care, hospitalization, and incomeloss.Does not
jnc1ue ..:orkmen'S cormipansatiort. Data pertain to 1918.17.
Food
Spending on virtually every category of food declined
in relative importance over this 30-year period, including
even meajs away Q_Q (which came as a surprise to me).
They claimed 6.7 out of every dollar in l91.7, but only 5.2
in 1977. (One can only imagine what the French would think
of this)
The most dramatic decline, again surprisingly, was f or
aj--which accounted for only 2.li% of the
1977 budget as against 5.3% in 1911.7.In fact, real consumption
of alcoholic beverages per capita increased only 12% over the
30 year period, despite the fact that its price relative to
all consumption items fell by 261° .Americansare indeed
drinking (relatively) less.
Accompanying the decline in relative spending on food
came a noticeable (though not necessarily
in their nutritive content). As Table 7 indicates, per capita
consumption of beef almost doubled, per capita consumption of
chicken almost tripled, and consumption of such luxury and
convenience items as ice cream, processed fruits, and processed
vegetables registered dramatic increases. Concurrent with
these increases came sharp declines in per capita consumption
of such obviously inferior goods as pork, lard, potatoes,
and corn meal. Consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables
also declined, though one may legitimately question whether
this marked an increase in living sL.andards. (Adelle Davis
lives I )I
Table7
CivilianPer Capita Consumption of Selected
Food Items, l9)i.0 and 1970 (in pounds per year)
Beef and Chicken and Processed Processed
Veal Turkey Fruitsa lece
l9I.0 62 17 31i 11
1970 117 51k. 71i. 18
Cornmeal Fresh Fresh
a_LQ.1tU
1910 71. 11. 139 22 139 117
1970 66 95 7 81 99
Source:Historica 1 Statisticsof the UnitedStatesVol.1,
SeriesG881-915.
acannedor frozen fruits and fruit juices; dried fruit
bcdor frozen18.
The costs of owning or renting a home or apartment
claimed 15.57° of consumer budgets in 1977 as against 9.970
in l9I.7. Almost all of the increase is accounted for by
as growing income levels and strong
incentives set up by the income tax system combined to induce
a substantial shift from renting to owning. In l9I.0 only
it.I% of Americans owned their own home; by 1970,63% did
(See Table 8, Part A).
It is worth noting that the rapid escalation of
housing prices that we have experienced in recent years was
flQ.. characteristic of the postwar period as a whole. In
fact, between 197 and 1977 housing prices increased only
15110whileconsumer prices in general increased 165 /0
Housingcommanded an increasing budget share because real
per capita consumption of housing tripled.
Some data compiled by Lebergott (1976) enable us to go
somewhat beyond these rather dry statistics. (See Table 8,
Part A.) Between 1914.0 and 1970, çowdig diminished
significantly. The fraction of housing units with more
persons than rooms declined from 20 percent to 8 percent,
and the average number of persons per room fell from .7
to .62 .The of housing also improved. The average
age of the housing stock fell by 1-4.years,the fraction of
housing units with running water increased from 7010 to 981°
and the fraction with flush toilets increased from 60% to
96T°5Table 8
Selected Changes in U.S. Housing,
191.0-197 0
Average AgePercent ner-





B. Characteristics of Household Oaeration
Percent with
CentralElectric LiiaL
Ene rgy Source forHea tina




Sources:Lebergott (1976); except or average age of (private




















Otherimprovementsin the way Americans are housed
become apparent only when we look at expenditures on household
operation. While the total budget share spent on this category
did not change, its composition underwent radical surgery.
Table 6 shows, for example, that the budget share allocated
to household_ap1iances fell almost in half between 1914.7 and
1977. What this conceals is that the very steep decline in
the relative prices of these items16 enabled Americans to
have more and more while spending less and less. By 1977,
spendingper capita on household appliances was more
than double what it had been in 1914.7, and the of household
durables must have increased by much more than this. Lebergott
(1976) reports, for example, that the fraction of American
families owning mechanical refrigerators increased from 1V/°
to 9910 between 1914.0 and 1970. The penetration of televisions
went from zero in 1914.0 to virtually i0OY° by 1970.
Sourçes_of power for household operation tell a
fascinating tale. Spending on electricity more than doubled
despite a çjxj, in its relative price; real spending per
capita increased more than five-fold. Concurrently, fuel oil
and coal demanded a decreasing share of consumers' budgets
despite a sharply jncreij relative price. In fact, household
usage of fuel oil and coal was unchanged in absolute terms
between 1914.7 and 1977 despite a 53Y0 increase in population.
There was, in brief, a veritable revolution in the way homes20.
wereheated--away fromdirty fuels like coal and wood, which
also require considerable effort to use, and toward cleaner
and more convenient fuels like oil, gas, and electricity.
Lebergott (1976), for example, reports that the fraction of
U.S. families heating by wood or coal dropped from 78'°toii.%,
whilethe fraction using oil or gas rose from 22°/° to 82"Io
,
between1911.0 and 1970. (See Table 8, Part B.)
There were other notable changes as well. The average
American used the teijione about 5 1/2 times as much in 1977
as in 1911.7, but did so while allocating a budget share only
twice as large.
Onefurther item which is of trivial importance in
consumer budgets nowadays,but is nonetheless interesting for
thelight it sheds on postwar changes in America, is spending
On In 1911.7, Americans spent 1./° of their
budgets on domesticservice--a sum almost as large as what they
spenton doctors and dentists, and even larger than what they
spent on either local public transportation or private education.
Aboutone household in lii. had a domestic employee. By 1977,
theprice of domestic service had increased 2l/° (versus 16%
for consumer prices in general); only about one household in
27 had a domestic worker;1 and this budget item claimed only
0.6 out of every consumer dollar. In real terms, the consumption
of domestic services declined by31% (or 55% on
a per capita basis). In the murder mysteries of the 1970s, the
butler was never there to do it.21.
Food, clothing, and shelter are supposed to be the
three basic necessities. Like food, clothing gobbled up a
smaller and smaller share of the consumer's budget during the
postwar period. By 1977, consumers were spending only 8 of
every dollar on clothing (including shoes, jewelry, and accessories)
as compared to 1l in 1911.7.In part, this was due to a decline
in the relative price of clothing (by 281° from 1911.7 to 1977);
but even real spending on clothing grew noticeably slower than
total spending.
Food, clothing, and shelter together, it may be noted,
absorbed fully 861° of total spending in 197 but less than
75% in 1977. Room was being made for non-necessities.
Spendingpatterns on transportation goods and services
reveal a pattern that is fascinating even though its basic
outlines are well-known. The almighty jJe was already
well ensconced on the American scene by 1914.7--claiming 8'/° of
consumer budgets for its purchase, care, and feeding (as
compared with only 1.8% for all forms of purchased transportation).
But the automobilization of America accelerated during the postwar
period. By 1977, consumers were spending 13.1 out of every
dollar on their cars, and a negligible O.8 on purchased
transportation.
When we recall that air travelwasalmost non-existent
in 1911.7, but dominated purchased inter-city travel by 1977,
the comparison is more dramatic still.Purchased transportation22.
excluding_air_travel took l.7 out of every consumer dollar in
1914.7, but only O.L in 1977. It is only a slight exaggeration
to say that the postwar period witnessed the death of the train,
the bus, and the subway.
Recreation
Spending patterns on recreational goods and services
offer some surprises. Even including foreign travel as
recreation,18 the share of recreational spending in consumer
budgets increased only 1.5 percentage points during the postwar
period.This is much less than Madison Avenue has led us to
expect. Furthermore, more than all of this increase was
accountedfor by only thrae categories of spending: foreign
travel (from O.'o to i.o'/°) purchases of televisions, radios,
and similar gocds (from O.9'' to i.5'°); and purchases of
recreational hardgoods such as toys, sports equipment, bicycles,
boats, etc. (from 1.2% to 1.8%). The case of TV's is
particularly remarkable since they claimed an increasing budget
share despite a price that fell absolutely by 16% (that's
right)19 America's love affair with the television is a notable
feature of the postwar period.
Several categories of recreational spending actually
made decreasing claims on the consumer's budget, notably
admissionsto soectator events (movies, theater, sport events)
which received only O.6 out of every consumer dollar in 1977
as compared to 1.2 in 1914.7. And this occurred despite the
fact that prices for such events rose 300% (as compared to
only 165% for overall consumer prices). Real purchasesof23.
such admissions actually eclia 16u/0 despite rising population
and rising real income. So much for the alleged boom in movies
and spectator sports.
Personal Services
Personal services are an odd mixture including such
diverse items as private educational spending, life insurance,
legal fees, and the costs of stock brokerage. All of these
grew rapidly, with spending on stockbrokers displaying the fastest
growth (increasing more than 18-fold) and life insurance costs
having the smallest (increasing more than 8-fold).
Medical Care
Everyone knows that Americans are spending more on
medical care than they did early in the postwar period (9.6%
of consumer budgets as compared to 14..5'/o). And everyone knows
that consumers are unhappy about the soaring costs of medical
care. The tremendous increase in the share of the budget going
to medical care is due both to its increasing relative price
and to a rapid increase in real consumption of medical services,
especially hospital services. While health has improved
demonstrably during the last 30 years (more on this in Section 6),
this may have been due more to advances in public health than
to increased personal expenditures on medical care.
During the 30-year period from 19I7 to 1977, real
consumption per capita increased by more than 80'° .Ascompared
to their counterparts in 1914.7, AmericrnS in 1977 travelled by211.
airplane and watched TV vastly more. They replaced pork, lard,
corn meal and fresh vegetables in their diets by beef, poultry,
andprocessed fruits and vegetables. They made much greater
use ofelectricity, the telephone, and hospitals, and they spent
muchmore on their own homes--whichthey heated by gas and oil
ratherthan by coal and wood. They bought more toys, sports
equionent, and other recreational goods (but not more admission
tickets), and devoted a good deal more of their budgets to
nurturing their cars.
Duringthe same period, travel by bus, rail, and subway
diminished greatly; domestic servants nearly disappeared from
the scene; and the basic necessities of life--food, clothing,
and shelter--commanded ever decreasing shares of the consumer
budget.
One seems forced to the conclusion that the average
level of economic well-being both changed in content and improved
drastically. Virtually everyone shared in economic growth, but
not equally. I turn my attention now to trends in income
inequa lity.
1L.__TresnIncomualj20
Whereas the level of income was mostly increasing
duringthe postwar period, the central stylized fact about
incore inequality has been its constang. Table 9 displays the
basic data that support this fact, and they certainly seemTable 9
The Distribution of Income, Families
and Unrelated Individuals Pooled, 1914.7-1977
Percentage Share of:
Lowest Second MiddleFourthHighest Gini
Year FifthFifthEifth_Fifthifth_TQ7o Ratio
19147 3.5 10.6 16.8 23.6 145.5 18.7 .1418
1952 3.5 10.9 17.3 214.1 1411.3 18.14 .1408
1957 3.li. 10.9 18.0 214.7 142.9 16.5 .397
1962 3.li. 10.11. 17.5 214.8 143.9 16.8
1967 3.6 10.6 17.5 214.8 14.3.14 16.5 .1400
1972 3.7 10.0 16.9 214.7 1414.8 17.14 .14114
1977 3.8 9.7 16.5 214.9 145.2 17.3 .1419
Highest 3.9 11.2 18.0 211.9 11.5.5 18.7 .1420
Mean 3.5 10.5 17.3 214.6 1414.1 17.2 .h08
Lowest3.1 9.7 16. 23.6 142.9 16. .397
Surce: Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 118, Table 13.25.
unequivocal.According to the Gini ratio, for example, 1957
was the most equal year and 1961 was the most unequal.
Inequality in 1977 was the same as it was in 191.7. If we accept
these data at face value, there clearly is no postwar trend in
income inequality.
But there are a host of very good reasons n to
accept these data at face value--which is why this section
occupies pages instead of one sentence. First, the changing
structure of the U.S. population by age, by sex, and by family
composition raise questions about the comparability of the data
over time. Rough "corrections" for these demographic shifts
point to a slight trend toward equality which the raw data mask.
Second, attempts to improve the measurement of income by subtract-
ing taxes, adding transfers in kind, and so on seem to produce
an income concept whose distribution displays greater equalization
over the period than does Census income. Third, and most
speculatively, it has been suggested that the portion of measured
inequality that is simply due to the fact that different people
are at different stages in their life cycles has increased
over the postwar period so that, if we could measure it, the
distribution of lifetime incomes would show a greater trend
toward equality than the distribution of annuJ incomes.
It turns out, most disagreeably for students of the
subject, that the sensitivity of the distribution of income in
the United States to subtle changes in the recipient population,
the definition of income, or the choice of accounting period is26.
extremely large--much greater in fact than any changes we can
find in inequality through time. This, I think, is the most
fundamentalsense in which we can say that inequality has been
relatively constant; but it also explains the urgency of sorting
out these seemingly boring issues of definition.
Such issues will occupy the bulk of this section. But
before getting buried in the details, I pause briefly to consider
a prior question: Does the (relatively constant) postwar income
distribution, with its Gini ratio in the .1l.O-.1i2 range, represent
a lot of inequality or a little?
the BottleHalf Fullor Haif Empy
Clearly,to paraphrase an exceedingly wise folk saying,
where you stand on this question depends on where you sit in
the income distribution. While an "objective" answer is clearly
out of the question, let me attempt several ways of providing
a frame of reference.
Cpa r is onsOver_Time
Ihave already noted that changes in inequality during
the postwar period have been too small to provide useful inter-
temporal comparisons. According to the Gini measure, 1957 had
the most equal distribution while 1961 had the least equal.
Yet the difference between their Gini ratios is a scant 6%
(see also Figure 1). So if we want to draw useful comparisons
through time, we will have to look back further into U.S.
history. Naturally, the quality of the data tails off rather
quickly as we do this; but some distributions for earlier years27.
have been constructed. Budd (1967, Introduction)has compiled
more or less consistent income distributions for several prewar
and several postwar years (See Table 10).21 The conclusion
seems to be that there was substantial equalization during the
years of the Great Depression and World War II, but very little
change since then. The postwar distribution seems noticeably
more equal than the distribution in 1929.
Insteadof comparing the postwar income distribution
of the United States with the U.S. income distribution in earlier
years, we might compare the U.S. with other countries at the
same time. The hazard here is that different countries use
different concepts of income and different definitions of the
recipient unit than the United States and, as just mentioned,
income distributions can be quite sensitive to these choices.
Of the many international comparisons that have been made, two
seem worth reporting here. Some years ago Irving Kravis (1960,
1962) made a careful series of binary comparisons by taking the
income distributions of 10 foreign countries and comparing each
one with a different U.S. distribution selected to be conceptually
alike. His conclusion was that income inequality in the U.S.
was rather less than in several less developed countries, but
somewhere near the middle of a group of modern industrial nations.
More recently, a study by Malcolm Sawyer for the OECD (1976)
attempted to put the distributional statistics of the various
OECD nations on an equal footing so that comparisons could beTable 10
Prewar and Postwar Income Distributionsa
Perc'PrtrSH ',f:
LowestSecond MiddleFourthHighest Top Gini
_EtI Ei.1L. ..1f1I_ _￿___ _tQ.
19.29
.3.59.0 13.8 19.3 30.0
1935-36 4..l 9.2 li..1 20.9 51.7 26.5 .7
191l 11.1 9.5 15.3 22.3 li.8.8 211.0
5.011.0 16.0 22.0 lt.6.o 20.9 .11.0
ii..610.9 i6. 22.7 11.5.5 19.6 •11.O
urce: Budd (1967), Table 1, p. xiii.
aFamilies and unrelated individuals, pooled. Based on Office
of Business Economics (now Bureau of Economic Analysis) income
concept.
bese Lorenz curves cross.28.
made. He found the U.S. and France to have the most income
inequalityamong OECDnations.
Theoverallconclusion, then, seems to be that income
inequality in the U.S. is higher than in many industrialized
nations, but lower than in most less developed countries.
Interoretingthe 1977 _Q)s tr ibut ion
Anotherway to appraise the degree of inequality is
to subject the most recent data on income shares to further
scriitiny along the following lines. (See Table 11.) Data for
1977 tell us that the richest fifth of American families received
8 times as much income as the poorest fifth.22 This 8:1 ratio,
whichis characteristic of the entire postwar period, strikes
me as a very substantial income gap.But some further facts
makethis inequality seem less severe.
First, it turns out that richer families tend to be
larger.The richest fifth offamilies in 1977 actually included
28'Y0more persons than the poorest fifth. Adjusting income to
aper capita basis would bring the 8:1income ratio down to 6:1.
Second,it turns out that the richest fifth of families in
1977 contained 29'/° of all the wage earners in the country,
whereas the poorest fifth contained only 91/2% .Thuson a
per-earner basis, the incomeratio was only 2.6:1.And even
thisratio can be lowered by consideringwork effort. The
richest fifth of families supplied over 30% of the total weeks
worked in the economy during 1977, while the poorest fifth supplied
only 7.7'° .Thus,on a per-week-of-work basis, the income ratioTable 11
Characteristics of the Upper and Lower




Top Fifth 22.14 28.9 30.11.
Bottom Fifth 5.2 17.5 9.5 7.5
TopTenth 25.6 ll.li. 15.1 15.7
Bottom Tenth 1.7 8.8 2.9
Source: Series P-60, No. 118,
Table 3,p.21.29.
between rich and poor was only 2:1. This certainly does not
seem like an unreasonable degree of inequality.23
Thus we can use the very same data to show that the
income gap between the rich and the poor is anything from 8:1
to 2:1--an ambiguity that will make propagandists (from either
side) happy. Which ratio is "right't" I certainly do not know.
On. the one hand, if differences in family size are voluntary
(richer parents "buy" more children), and decisions over whether
and how much to work are involuntary (due mostly to whether
jobs are available), then none of the corrections are warranted
and the 8:1 ratio seems most meaningful. On the other hand,
if we assume that people voluntarily choose their labor supply
but not their family size, then all the corrections leading to
a 2:1 ratio are appropriate. To state the issue this way is
to demonstrate its irresolvability. Clearly, all of these
choices have voluntary and involuntary aspects.
B. De rn ogrhic Charige s a
Iturn now to the first of our problems in interpreting
the postwar income distribution data, and in accepting the
conclusion that inequality has not changed: demographic
changes.2 This section makes three main points. First,
demographic changes have been substantial.2 Second, measured
income inequality is quite sensitive to the composition of the
underlying population of recipient units. Third, many of the
demographic changes that occurred were of the sort that raise30.
measured inequality.
Families_versus Unrelated_Individuals
A logical place to start is with the division of the
U.S. population between families and unrelated individuals.
As Table 12 shows, this division has changed dramatically over
thepostwar period, and especially over the last decade.In
this ten-year period, the population of the United States over
the age of 16 increased 19% ,butthe number of Census families
increased only i1.% ,andaverage family size fell from 3.67
to 3.33 persons. By contrast, the number of unrelated individuals
grew by an astounding % in these same 10 years. These figures
reflect several striking demographic trends, including a growing
propensity for both the young and the old to live apart and an
increasing incidence of broken marriages.
Table 13 shows why these developments are important
for interpreting income distribution data. Unrelated individuals
have always had much lower and much more unequally distributed
incomes than have families, though there was some convergence
in both respects during the last decade. Thus the demographic
shifts that underlie Table 12, many of which clearly represent
improvements in well-being, lowered average income and increased
income inequality when families and unrelated individuals are
pooled in a single distribution.
A first step, therefore, is to look separately at
trends in the distributions among families and among unrelated
individuals (Uls). These are summarized in Tables l1i and 1,Table 12
199fl
ofUn its iL 19L
Fnii1ies 82.1Eo.879.171.2
Unrelated individualS 17.919.220.928.8
p e of jo 19 in
Frni1ieS 93.93.093.389.2
Unrelatedindividuals 6.E7.06.7 10.8
Source: Current P3DU1atiOflR Series p-60,os.59,liii.,
118, and S9ries P-20, Nos. 21,3.Table 13
Comparison of Income Distributions






individual 1,3O6 6,!i03 7,981
()Ratio(2)/Cl) .'5 •'l't
GiniRatio
(k) nong families .376 .351 .311.8 .361!
(5)Among unrelated
individuals .552 .189
(6)Ratio ()/(') l.17 1.39 1.22
Source: Current Poouiation Reports, SeriesP-60, Nos. 1111., 118.
income in 1977 dollars. Price deflation by Consumer
Price Index.Table lit
The Distribution of Income Among Families,
1914.7 -1977















19147 5.0 11.9 17.0 23.1 11.3.0 17.5 .376
1952 11.9 12.3 17.11. 23.Ji l.9 17.11 .368
1957 5.1 12.7 18.1 23.8 11.0.11. 1.6 .351
1962 5.0 12.1 17.6 211.0 11.1.3 15.7 .362
1967 5.5 12.14 17.9 23.9 140.11 15.2 .3118
1972 5.11. 11.9 17.5 23.9 141.11 15.9 .360
1977 5.2 11.6 17.5 214.2 141. 15.7 .3611.

















The Distribution of Income Among
Unrelated individuals, 1911.7-1977
Percentage Share of:
cur fl .].ationRortgSeriesP-60, No. 118, Table 13.
YearFifthFifth Fifth
197 2.0 6.2 12.7
1952 2.6 7.7 1ti..7
1957 2.6 7.3 13.7
1962 2.6 7.5 12.8
1967 3.0 7.5 13.5
1972 3.3 8.2 13.8
1977 11.1 9.0 114.7
Highest13.2 9.0 114.8
Mean 2.8 7.6 13.7
















































but before considering these data one technical point must be
made (with due apologies to the casual reader). Data on
percentile shares for the years 1958 through 1977 were computed
in the obvious way: by ranking consumer units and adding up
their incomes. For the years 1911.7 through 1957, however, the
micro data required to do this were unavailable, so shares were
estimated and interpolated from grouped data. The post-1958
data are thus more trustworthy than the pre-1958 data, and we
must keep this in mind in looking for trends.26
In the case of families, the data show some trend
toward equality before 1957 though little since then--which
raises the question of whether we are seeing a trend or a
statistical illusion. Between 19)#7 and 1957, there were clear
(if modest) upward trends in the shares of the second, middle,
and fourth fifths. All of these gains came at the expense of
the upper fifth (and especially the top %),whoseshares
declined quite markedly. Since 1958, however, there is little
trend of any kind. The only development worth noting is the
climb of the share of the lowest fifth from the 11..5-57Orange
to around 5.5 /0 during the years 1961-1966. The host of public
assistance policies introduced or expanded around that time is,
of course, the leading explanation for this improvement in the
lot of poor families.
Using the Gini ratio to summarize these data, all of
this can be said more concisely by noting that, once cyclical
effects are removed, the Gini ratio exhibits a mild downward32.
trend (about -.002 per year) until 1957 and no trend thereafter.27
The story with unrelated individuals seems to have
been just the reverse: relative stability until 1957, followed
by a marked trend toward equaiity.28
The share of the lowest fifth fluctuated aimlessly
through 1957, apparently underwent a shift (not shown in Table
15) when the nature of the data changed in 1958, and marched
steadily upward thereafter. The shares of the second and third
fifths did very little until about 1961i., and then also started
to move up strongly. In total, the combined share of the lower
60% of the income distribution increased from 25.Is.7Oto287°
between 1961s. and 1975--a substantial improvement. The upper
o%,naturally,were the losers. Beginning around 1960 or
so, the shares of these two quintiles exhibit a noticeable
downward trend.
All of these conflicting forces:
*an equalizing trend in the family distribution until
1957 but not after (Table iI.)
*an equalizing trend in the distribution among UI's
since 1957 but not before (Table 15);
*a decrease in the portion of the population in families
(Table 12);
*a widening of the income gap between families in UI's
between 1917 and 1957 and a narrowing of that gap from 1967
to 1977 (Table 13);
get amalgamated in the pooled distribution to produce very33.
little overall trend despite some equalization in both
component distributions.
ing ArnericnFarni
Butwe do not solve the problem of demographic change
simply by separating families from unrelated individuals (Uls).
For, as we learned in Tables 2 and 3,boththe composition of
families and the nature of the UI population underwent substantial
demographic change during the postwar period. To keep the
discussion manageable, I limit myself to families in what follows.
But the reader should keep in mind that equally dramatic changes
were occurring in the demography of unrelated individuals, with
corresponding effects on the income distribution.
Just what were the changes in the structure of the
American family, and how did they affect the distribution of
income? We can answer these questions with the help of Table
2 (On page ,whichlists some important demographic changes,
and Table 16, which illustrates the extreme sensitivity of
income inequality to the nature f the recipient unit.29
Average family size was constant between 191i-7 and
1967, but fell dramatically during the following ten years
due to a sharp decline in the number of children. This means
that family income çjtagrewmore rapidly than mean family
income. The distribution of families by size shows that most
of the statistical "action't came in the two tails. At one
extreme the fraction of families with two members drifted up
slowly from 191.7-1967, and then skyrocketed between 1967 andTable 16













Other marital status .565
Nonfarni .311.7
Farm .11.33
ill, to 211.years .302
25 to 311. years .291
35 to 11.11. years .316
11.5to511.years .330
55 to 6years .379






Did not work .11.52
Worked .327
At full-time jobs .311
At part-time jobs .11.1111.Table 16 (continued)
White .34.9
Nonwhite .399
S_g:U.S. Bureau of the Census, Technical Paper 17,
in the Income of Families and Persons in the United
States.__199, Tables 23, 2L,25, 26,28, 32, and 33.
aThCLorenz curves for 3-person and 6-person farilies cross
between the 60th and 80th percentiles.
bThe Lorenz curves for ages 1t.-2l. and ages 25-514. cross between
the 30th and 95th percentiles. The Lorenz curvesfor ages 25-314.
andages 35_14.14. cross between thekOth and 60th percentiles.314..
1977.30 At the otherextreme, the numberoffamilies with six
or more members also drifted up slowly during the first two
postwar decades, but then took a nosedive between 1967 and
1977. Relative to 1911.7, we now have more childless couples,
fewer families with four children ormore, and fewer extended
families. But since Table 16 shows that the greatest degree
of inequality is found among the largest and smallestfamilies,
it is not clear that these very large demographic shifts had
much influence on the trend in inequality.
The next change in family composition worthy of note
is the increased incidence of female headship. The fraction
of families headed by females, which fluctuated in arange
around 10i° from 191i.7 to 1967, shot up to ll1..11.%by 1977.
Since female-headed families normally have lower incomes than
male-headed families, and since Table 16 shows that they also
typically have more unequally distributed incomes, this factor
tended to retard the growth of income per family and to increase
inequality.
The farm population dwindled remarkably during the
postwar period. In 1911.7, more than one family in six lived
on a farm. By 1977, this was down to one family in 26. It is
quite likely that this migration from the farm reduced income
inequality because farm incomes are much more unequally distributed
than nonfarm incomes (see Table 16), and because farm incomes
are typically much lower than nonfarm incomes. However, there
is a complication that bears mentioning. Censusmoney income35.
excludesincome received in kind, which is probably far more
important on farms than elsewhere. Since Census data therefore
overstate the gap between farm and nonfarrn incomes,they probably
also overstate the equalization caused by the migration from
rural areas.
The age structure of families (as measured by the
age of the family head) also changed dramatically. Between 19I.7
and 1977, the number of young (under 25) and old (6 and over)
families grew much faster than the number in the prime earning
years (ages 35-6I.). (Table 2.) Given the facts that families
at the extremes of the age distribution always have much lower
incomes than those in the middle, and that the income distribution
among the elderly is quite unequal (Table 16), this development
pushed inequality up.31
In summary, the changing age-sex composition of family
heads pushed the distribution of income toward greater inequality
while the movement off the farm pushed in the opposite direction.
In addition, there were a host of other demographic changes,
some of which may have had substantial effects on measured
income inequality. Indeed, given the extreme sensitivity of
income inequality to demography that Table 16 documents, it is
somewhat amazing that the distribution of income among families
changed so little during a period when the demographic structure
changed so much.36.
C.Measured Inequality and
It has already been mentioned that the concept of
income used by the Census Bureau is far from ideal. Twoobvious
questions follow. First, if we could measure income better,
would inequality appear less than in the official data?
Second, if we could measure income better, would a stronger
trend toward equality emerge? This section answers both of
these questions in the affirmative.32
Specifically,this section deals with five potential
improvements in the Census income concept: subtracting personal
taxes, adding intransfers in kind, adding in other types of
income in kind, including capital gains, and correcting for
underreporting of income. in addition, the influence of cash
transfers on inequality is examined. As in the previous section,
we shall see that changes in the definition of income typically
cause changes in measured inequality that exceed anything we
can find in the time series.
PersonalTaxes
Wecan probably make sense of an income distribution
that excludes both public transfer payments and taxes or one
that both. But Census income is an awkward halfway
house which includes transfers but fails to deduct taxes.
Thus a first step in improving the Census income concept is to
subtract personal taxes.33 In practice, most studies have
deducted only federal taxes, thus leaving state income taxes37.
in the alleged "post-tax" income figures.1 The federal income
tax is decidedly progressive. The payroll tax, while regressive
relativeto ea ings, is not quite so regressive relative to
because low income groups receive a large proportion of
their total income in transfers. Deducting both income and
payroll taxes thus e measured inequality noticeably,
asTable 17 shows.35
A similar study by Taussig (1973), using 1967 data
and an income concept similar to Census income, reported that
federal personal taxes reduced the Gini coefficient from .376
to.361. It seems unlikely that including state and local income
taxes would change these figures very much, but including sales
and excise taxes might.6 I conclude that the distribution of
post-tax income in any one year is moderately more equal than
the distribution of pre-tax income. The difference, however,
isnot dramatic.
Because personal taxes have grown faster than pre-tax
income (Table),itseems obvious that subtracting them from
Census income each year would increase the trend toward equality.
Yet a careful study of the 1950-1970 period by Reynolds and
Smolensky(1977) contradicts this supposition. They conclude,
instead,that while taxes equalized the distribution of any
oneyear, taxes had almostno effect on the trend in inequality
ofafter-tax income.37 Why the discrepancy? Reynolds andTable 17
Effect of Federal Personal Taxes on the

























Srnolensky (1977) show that federal personal taxes became less
progressive between 1950 and 1970 for several reasons, the
most important of which were (a) the increasing importance of
the payroll tax relative to the income tax, (b) the decreasing
progressivity of the income tax.
Transfers In Kind
Recent years have witnessed a sharp controversy, both
in academic journals and in the popular press, over the extent
to which adding transfers in kind to income would change the
portrait of inequality in postwar America. The controversy is
over the nJy dimensions of the effect, not its aual.itative
direction, since no one disputes that (a) transfers in kind
have grown much faster than factor incornes,8 and (b) the
distribution of transfers in kind is much more pro-poor than
the distribution of factor incomes. These undisputed facts
are enough to conclude that more equality in any given year
and a stronger trend toward equality would emerge if the
distribution of income were adjusted to include transfers in
kind. But how much more?
The reason for the controversy boils down to this.
Whileit isstraightforward to estimate the total volume of
in-kindprograms such as food stamps, public housing, public
education, and medical services provided under Medicare and
Medicaid, it is not quite so straightforward to distribute these39.
totalsamong income groups. And it is even more difficult to
decide how to price them out. Treating a dollar spent on a
transfer in-kind as equivalent to a dollar received in cash
seems inappropriate unless the transfer in kind provides
precisely what the consumer would have used the extra cash to
purchase. However, there are two cases in which transfers in
kind are just as good as cash.39 The first is when the government
provides goods that the consumer would otherwise have purchased
anyway, and provides of them than the consumer would have
bought for himself. In this case, the transfer in kind does
not affect budget allocation decisions and is equivalent to a
cash transfer. Food stamps come close to fitting this pattern;
it is arguable whether Medicare-Medicaid do. However, it seems
clear that public education and public housing are not of this
character. The second case is where the good that is distributed
can be resold with insubstantial transactions costs (e.g., a
transferable ration coupon). It is clear, however, that few,
if any, public programs fit this second model.
Apart from these exceptional cases, it is conceptually
clear that transfers in kind are worth less to recipients than
what they cost to provide. But how much less? This question
can only be answered by positing some utility function and
assessing the cash equivalent (in utilityterms) of each
transfer in kind. An excellent recent study by Smolensky
(1977) didprecisely this, and concluded that the cash
equivalentof l in either food stamps or rent supplements wasessentially l, but that l spent on either public housing or
Medicare/Medicaid was worth substantially less than l to
recipients .1
Table 18 summarizes the results of two conflicting
studies of the effects of transfers in kind on the distribution
of income in 1972, under the (possibly false) assumption that
such transfers should be valued at full cost. The adjustment
adds between 1.8 and 2.3 percentage points to the share of the
poorest fifth of families, depending on whose assumptions about
the volume and distribution of noneducational transfers we use,2
and subtracts a like amount from the share of the richest fifth.
These are substantial changes. However, the increment to the
share of the lowest fifth would be reduced by about 0.5 percentage
point if transfers in kind were valued at 7070ofcost iristead.1
We are thus far from agreement over how large the
effect of transfers in kind has been on the postwar trend
toward equality. After a series of papers by Browning (1976,
1979)and Srneeding (1979a, 1979b), airing this and a number of
otherissues, itappears (Smeeding, 1979b) that Brownings
adjustments (including one for transfers in kind) raise the share
of the lowest fifth of families in 1972 from. /0 inthe raw
data all the way to Srneeding'scorrections, by contrast,
raise it only to 6.510.Thedifferenceis hardly inconsequential,
thoughonly part of it traces to their divergent treatments of
'VTable 18
Effect of Transfers In-Kind on the
Distribution of Income Among Families,
- 1978
Share of:
LowestFifth Higes t Fifth
1. Census income 5.11.070 141.3670
2. Census income plus
educational transfers 5.97 11.0.22
3. Census income plus
noneducationa 1 transfers
(i) Browning 7.29 11.0.09
(ii)Smeeding 6.75 11.0.37
I. Census income plus a1
in-kindtransfers
(i)Browning 7.70 39.09
(ii) Smeeding 7.21 39.35




This seems an appropriate time to ask how large an
equalizing effect cashtransfershave had on the distribution
of income. Unlike the other concerns of this section, this
does not constitute a "correction" of Census income, since
Census income already includes cash transfers; but the issue
seems important enough to merit special attention.
By how much do cash transfers reduce income inequality
in any given year? A number of studies have tried to answer
this question, with relatively good agreement that cash transfers
have decreased the Gini ratio by about 12io in recent years.
Taussig's (1973) study shows that the equalizing impact of cash
transfers is much greater than that of taxes. The study by
Smolensky t i. (1977) enables us to compare the equalizing
effectsof cash and in-kind transfers with the following results:
Reduction in the Gini Ratio
From cash transfers -.014.6
From in-kind transfers
valued at full cost -.027
valuedat cash
equivalent -.016
Clearly cash transfers are much more important as equalizers,
even if transfers in kind (including educational transfers)
are valued on a dollar for dollar basis. If we adjust for the
estimated lower value of certain transfers in kind, the
predominanceof cash transfers is even clearer.14.2.
I conclude that cash transfers are a very major source
of income equality--substantially more important than either
personaltaxes or transfers in kind. The equalization is
accomplishedmainly by raising the incomes of thelowest fifth.
Butwhat of the trend in inequality? As Table 14. showed, transfers
have become an increasingly important source of income since
1957, and especially since 1967. We also know that the lower
income strata receive a disproportionately large share of these
transfers .Thusit is clear thatcash transfers pushed the
distribution of income in the direction of greater equality
during the postwar period. For example, Danziger and Plotnick
(1977) estimated that transfer payments reduced the Gini
coefficient by .069 (or 114..14.To) in 19714. compared to only .014.8
(or1110) in 1965.
While this is a noticeable effect over so short a
periodof time, itis surprising that the explosive growth of
transfersdid not push inequality down even faster. Three
reasons suggest themselves. First, transferpayments may
createdisincentives for earning income that disequalize the
distributionof factor income. Second, these transfer payments
may have helped finance the splitting up of family units that
led to increasing inequality. Third, Reynolds and Smolensky
(1978) have suggested that transfers and other government
programs follow a typical life cycle pattern that dulls their
initial redistributive thrust. Specifically, as redistributive
programsmature and reach a wider clientele, their benefits1l3.
becomeless concentrated o.- the poor. Thus, as the benefits
from these programs grow larger in the aggregate, they simultaneously
start t be distributed in a less pro-poor manner.
Other Income In Kind
Transfers in kind have already been discussed, but
some factor payments are also made in kind rather than in cash.
Major items here include food and lodging consumed by farmers
and farm workers, fringe benefits that are either partially
or totally subsidized by employers (e.g., medical insurance,
company cars), and the benefits that many self-employed individuals
siphon out of their businesses (unbeknownst to the tax collector).
Onbalance, it is quite unclear to me whether including this
potpourri of items would increase or decrease measured inequality
inany given year, though both Schultz (1975) and Henle (1972)
have speculated that they are disequalizing. There are no
studies that shed much light on this issue.6
Nonetheless, I would still hazard a guess that, were
weable to measure it,the addition of (nontransfer) income
inkind to the CPS data would lead to a more disequalizing
trend. One reasonis that food and lodging consumed on farms
(which is distributed in a pro-poor manner) has declined as
a fraction of all income in kind, while fringe benefits (which
are distributed in a more pro-rich pattern) have increased
dramatically.another reason was mentioned earlier: the farm/
nonfarrnincome differential is exaggerated by omission of income
inkind.14I..
L2J.a!.
Ithas often been suggested that the CPS understates
the degree of income inequality because it excludes capital
gains--which accrue almost exclusively to the rich. And the
one scrap of evidence we have on this issue supports this idea.
When Smeeding (1979a) distributed an aggregate of accrued
capital gains constructed by Browning (1976) among families
for the year l972, he found that the share of the highest
fifth increased by l.1.i. percentage points.
I am dubious about the value of this exercise because
many, indeed most, capital gains are not gains of real purchasing
power, but simply represent maintenance (or rather partial
maintenance)of principle in an inflationary world. Obviously,
if tl inflation rate is 87°,a5O stock must increaseper
year just to maintain its real value. Theseincrements, if
theyoccur, are not gains in real terms. A careful study by
Eisner (1980) shows that over the 1911.6-1977 period as a whole,
the more than 3 trillion in nominal capital gains that households
received failed (by a very small margin) to provide compensation
for inflation. "Real" capital gains, in a word, were as often
losses as gains.
Because of the extremely pro-rich pattern by which
capital gains are distributed, it is clear that their inclusion
wouldqaize theincome distribution in any. year for
which aggregate real gains are positive (as Smeeding and Browning
found). But it is equally clear that including capital gains1.5.
wouldguaiize the distribution of income in any year for
which aggregate real gains are negative. Since gains were
roughly zero in an "average" postwar year, I conclude that the
omission of capital gains in the CPS data is not misleading on
average,though it does conceal some sizeablevariations in
inequalityfrom year to year.
What of the trend? Eisner's (1980, Table 3) data
on real capital gains as a fraction of disposable income show
violent fluctuations but absolutely no trend.8 It is thus
highly unlikely that the omission of capital gains distorts
our picture of the postwar trend in income inequality.
TheCPS is plagued by underreporting of all sorts of
income. But the two biggest underreporting problems come at
oppositeends of the income distribution: transfer payments
(which are received mainly by the poor) and property income
(which is received mainly by the rich). As a consequence,
a correction for underreporting would raise the incomes of
both the poor and the rich relative to the middle class, making
it unclear whether measured inequality would rise or fall.
What a series of such corrections might do to the postwar
trend in inequality is totally obscure.
Table 19 summarizes this section by bringing together
estimates, many of them admittedly dubious, of the effects on
the distribution of income of all the adjustments discussed
here. The overall conclusion seems to be that patchingup
the Census income concept probably would lead to a distributionli.6.
ofincome with noticeably more equality in any one year, but
only a j1] stronger trend toward equality over the postwar
period as a whole.
While there is a good deal of guesswork involved, it
is conceivable that all the adjustments together might reduce
the level of the Gini ratio by about .050 in any one year--a
change which exceeds by far the difference between the highest
and lowest Gini ratios recorded in Table 1I..For the share of
the poorest fifth of families, it is clear that transfers in
kind are the most important adjustment, though personal taxes
and underreporting also matter. For the share of the richest
fifth. of families, transfers in kind, personal taxes, and (in
some years) capital gains, are all quite important.
Where the trend in inequality is concerned, all the
adjustments together seem likely to lead to more equalization
through time, mainly because of transfers in kind. However,
the effects of improving the income definition seem unlikely to
be as strong as the effects of the demographic changes discussed
in the previous section.
D. Measured Inqua1i and tAcçout ing_
It is clear that the distribution of income would look
more equal if income were measured over an accounting period
longer than a year because:
(a) some year-to-year fluctuations would be
"smoothed out";Table 19
Effects of Adjustments in the Income
Concept on the Distribution of Income
Effect of Share on: Effecton
Effect on Trend
Adiustroent LQii JJfth Towa rda
1.Subtract personal b taxes -.015 +O.3c _l.7c Q
2.Add in-kind transfers
At full value 027d 20e 21e +
Ato7o value 016d 16e
3.Add other income
in kind
.Addcapital gains 0 0 0 0
.Adjustfor under-
f reporting NA +0.1
NA =Notavailable.
CA??T signmeans the correction would nçeasethetrend toward
eua11. A "-"signmeans the correction would decrease the
trend toward equality. A zero means approximately no effect.
bF Taussjq (1973).
CFr0 Radner (1979).
dFrom Srtiolensky t a] (1977).
ecomputed by author from data in Srneeding (1979a) and Browning
(1979). Both educational and noneducatiorial in-kind transfers
are ircluded. Since the two sources disagree on the latter,
their estimates have been averaged.
caicuiate by the author from data in Smeeding (1979a).14.7.
(b) part of the inequality in any one year's income
distribution is due to the fact that people are at different
stages of their life cycles, and income varies systematically
by age.
It is not obvious, however, that these considerations
have much bearing on the ininequality. The fact that
there are transitory income fluctuations will distort our picture
of the trend only if the variability of income has increased
or decreased systematically over time.It is far from evident
that this is true. Similarly, the fact that life cycle
influences contributs to measured inequality, will alter the
trend only if these life cycle influences have grown more (or
less) important over time. Here, however, it has been claimed
that this is in fact the case- -that the gap between ann1.
incomeinequality and lifetimeincomeinequality has increased
50
. overthe postwar period. An examination of this controversy
is the major task of this section.
TransitorylncorneFluctua t ions
The natural approach to correcting for transitory
fluctuations in income is to follow households through time
and average their incomes over multi-year periods. Up until
quite recently, there was a dearth of data with which to do
this. Kravis (1962) had studied a panel of households for
five years between 1914.9 and 19514., finding inequality (as
measured by the Gini ratio) over 5 years to be about l0'° less
than inequality in a single year. He had also examined 12
years of Delaware tax returns (1925-1936), and found the 12-year
Gini ratio to be 8°lowerthan the average of the 1-year Gini4.8.
ratios.
The availability of several panel studies in the U.S.
in recent years has verified Kravis' findings. Various sets
of panel data have been used by Benus and Morgan (1975),
Kohen, Parnes and Shea (1975), Hoffman and Podder (1976),
David and Menchik (1979) and others to reach the following
general conclusions.
1. Gini ratios for income over 3 years generally are
about 3-570 lower than Gini ratios for l-year,1 though reductions
as large as 10% have been found.52
2.If we stretch the accounting period to 7 years,
the drop in the Gini ratio increases to 97oevenif we restrict
attention to families with the same head throughout the period.53
3. Because of the specific way it weights reductions
in inequality at various points on the Lorenz curve, the Gini
ratio seems to decline less as the accounting period is lengthened
than do other measures of inequa1ity.
If these sound like small adjustments, it should be remembered
that a lO'° decline in the Gini ratio (e.g., from .360 to .3214)
is absolutely collossal compared to anything we can find in the
time series data (see Table i.s.).
It is clear that inequality over the lifetime is lower
than inequality in any one year, but here the absence of hard14.9.
data make it necessary to resort to simulation and estimation
techniques.
My simulation study (Blinder, 19714.) "guesstimated"
thatinequality in lifetime income was about 3O'/C lower than
inequality in a single year if the Gini measure was used, but
about 1O-5'o lower if the coefficient of variation was used to
measureinequality.55 Lillard (1977) estimated that the Gini
ratio for lifetime earning was about I1.50 less than that for
annual earnings in a very special group of American men. Gordon
(1976) estimated that for a sample of white male heads of
households between 30 and 55 years of age, the share of the
lowest fifth in lifetime income was 8.71°, compared to
6.7'oinannual income .Withoutactualdata, itis hard to
knowhow accuratethese estimates are.6
Ourbestguess is thus that the difference between
lifetimeinequality and annual inequality is very great. But
is this important for interpreting the postwar trend in inequality?
To answer this, think of a population composed of different
age groups. Inequality can increase if:57
1.Inequality within age groups increases.
2. The distribution of families across age groups
shifts toward groups with greater inequality.
3. Income differences by age become more pronounced.
What do the data tell us about each of these factors?
1.Data covering l9I7-l9614. reveal only weak downward
trends in age-specific Gini ratios.8 Danziger etal. (1977)
found that if all age-specific Gini ratios had been constant.
at their 1965 levels, the Gini ratio for 1972 would have been50.
(very slightly) lower than it was. Thus it seems that factor
1 was operative, but very weak.
2. As noted earlier (see page and Table 2),
changes in the age structure of families were substantial and
disequalizing. Over 1965-1972, Danziger et al. (1977) found
that the shifting age distribution added .011 to the Gini
coefficient (which increased in total by .016). Blinder
and Esaki (1978) created a time series of hypothetical income
distributions covering l914.7-1971- on the counterfactual assumption
that the age distribution did not change. They found that the
effect of the shifting age distribution on quintile shares,
whiledisequalizing, was very modest.
3.Thedata do show an increased arching inthe age-
incomeprofile, as Figure 3 illustrates.59 Danziger et a1
(1977)attributed a.005 increase in the Gini ratio between
1965and 1972 to this factor. We lack a study of this factor
over a longer period of time.
On balance, it seems clear that the shifting age
distribution and the increased curvature of the age-income
profile have caused income inequality to increase during the
postwar period, despite small declines in age-specific inequality.
But the magnitude of the effect seems modest.
Yet, in a controversial paper, Paglin (1975) claimed
thatthe shiftingage distribution counteracted what would
otherwise have been a very strong trend toward greater income///
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equality among families. Whereas the raw data (see Table iii.)
show rather little downward trend in income inequality between
19L1.7 and 1972 (a 1-.'7°declinein the Gini ratio), Gini ratios
that Paglin (197) presented as "corrected" for age factors
exhibit a very strong downward trend (dropping 217°).It
behooves us to examine Paglin's calculations. Is his method
a valid way to "remove" the influence of the changing age
structure from the data?
Paglin's technique for decomposing the Gini ratio is
straightforward. Begin by constructing a hypothetical Lorenz
curve on the assumption that all families of the same age (as
defined by the family head) have the same income, and use the
area between this hypothetical Lorenz curve and the actual
Lorenz curve (shaded in Figure )asa measure of inequality
due to factors other than the life cycle. This simple
decomposition seems appealing at first, but does not survive
closer examination.0
Pyatt (1976), and before him Bhattacharya and Mahalanobis
(1967),haveshown that the Gini ratio can be decomposed into
thrcomponents (not two): (a) a weighted-average of the age-
specific Gini ratios (or of any other desired grouping), (b) a
part dependent on the differences in average incomes across
61 age groups, and (c) a part due to the overlapping of the groups.
Paglin is presumably interested in isolating
(a) above; but by subtracting term (b), he is actually left
with parts (a) and (c). Since part (c) has no intuitive
interpretation, the Paglin measure of age-corrected inequalityPercentage of
All Income
Figure 1i.





can exhibit strange behavior, as Danziger, Havernan, and Smolensky
(1977) have shown. In terms of the three age-related factors
enumerated on page ,Paglin'sprocedure does notsucceed
in isolating factor 1.
I conclude that while Paglin's basic point--that postwar
changes in life cycle influences on income distribution have
masked some of the trend toward equality--is correct, he has
probably exaggerated its quantitative significance.
Arelated point should be dealt with here. There is
considerable churning within the income distribution from year
to year. The same families do not always populate the bottom
fifth, the top 5/O,etc.If our realconcern (for welfare
purposes) is with income inequality over some lengthy period
oftime, then it is clear that we can get a good degree of
equality in either of two ways:
1.Families could occupy essentially the same relative
positions year after year, but the annual distribution (and
hence the multi-yeardistribution) could be quite equal.
2. Theannual distribution of income could be quite
unequal, but families could move around within the distribution
so much that the multi-year distribution of income was quite
equal.
In this sense, income equa1iy and income rnoJy
are substitutes for oneanother.62 In fact, I am certainly not
the first to speculate that mobility occupies a more exalted53.
place in the American constellation of value judgments than
does equality. Americans seem quite willing to tolerate gross
disparities in incomes so laig as there is a reasonable chance
that low-income families in one year can become high-income
families in another year. With very little mobility, on the
other hand, even a Gini ratio of .300mightbeconsidered
intolerable.
The studies cited earlier, and several others as well,
seemto suggest a good deal of mobility in the U.S. income
distribution--especially near the bottom of the distribution6
and among the young.6 To cite just one summary statistic,
LanearidMorgan (1975) found that the rank correlation for family
money income between years 1 and 6 of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics was only .ti?(or.61. among families with the same head
in the two years). While ghetto dwellers rarely trade places
withRockefellers, ours is not astratified society.
__ça_spc ts ofIneguali
Social scientists and philosophers have long been
intrigued by issues relating to equality in the abstract. Layman
and political figures, by contrast., have shown rather less
interest in equality than in such related (and more concrete)
issues asthe plight of the poor, income differentials by
race, and income differentials by sex. Each of these special
aspectsof income inequality has been the focus of a major public
policy initiative during the postwar period.For these reasons,514..
eachof them merits special attention.
As just noted, the revealed political preferences of
the American public show much less concern with inequality than
with the plight of the inhabitants of lower tail of the
distribution--thepoor. As Lampman (1973) has remarked, this
country has never set a target for theGini ratio. Ithas,
however,declared war on poverty and set specific targets for
itsreduction. Who is winning the War on Poverty?
DfininaPoverM6
It turns out, however, not to be so easyto separate
thespecific problem of poverty from the more general problem
of income inequality. The reason is clear enough. Income is
a continuous variable, whose distribution can be estimated.
Poverty, however, is a dichotomous variable: a family is either
poor or it is nonpoor. To decide who is poor, we must place
a"pove4y line" somewhere in the income aistribution, as
depicted in Figure 5, and count how many families (or people)
fall below it. Unfortunately, there are many ways to place
the line.
At one extreme, we could base our poverty line on a
of poverty: a family is deemed poor
if and only if its income is insufficient to purchase. a prescribed
bundle of goods and services. Since the bundle is fixed, the
poverty line is increased only to adjust for inflation.This
concept of poverty, which underlies the official poverty counts
of the U.S. government, has been criticized on many grounds.Density of Population







1.It seems to contradict publicnotionsof what
constitutes poverty. This point is obvious when we consider
long periods of time: the rich of centuries ago lacked many
of the conveniences that today's poor routinely have. But
Section 3 showed how dramatic changes in the standard of living
have been even over a period as short as 30 years. It would
be surprising indeed if the concept of poverty had not changed
accordingly, and evidence from public opinion polls and elsewhere
suggeststhat it has.66
2. The bundle of goods and services is inherently
arbitrary. Whoknowswhat items every family must have if it
is not to be deemed "poor?" Answers to this question are
arbitrary at best. Official definitions of poverty in the
United States are essentially obtained by defining a food budget
and tripling
3.Itis clear that economic growth will eventually
pull almost everyone above any purely absolute poverty line.
Contrary to the Bible, there would be no meek left to inherit
the earth This definition seems to make the War on Poverty
too easy to win.
The unexceptionable idea that what constitutes poverty
is culturally, not biologically, determined leads us away from
a purely absolute standard of poverty. But where do we stop?
We could go all the way to a anddefine
the poor as the lowest 2010 of the income distribution. Under
thisdefinition, the "War on Poverty" would be unwinnable bi56.
definition; andthe Bible would be literally correct: ye have
the poor always with you. Personally, I find this to be not an
unattractive definition of poverty. However, it does require
that we amend the poverty-reduction goal. Counting the poor
will no longer do; instead, it is natural to study trends in
the share of total income received by the lowest 20%. This,
of course, has been done at length in this chapter. By this
definition, the "special" problem of poverty has already been
considered, with the conclusion that poverty has been eroding--but
slowly.
There are, of course, intermediate grounds between purely
absolute and purely relative standards of poverty. Poverty lines
based on "minimum decency" budgets recognize psychological as
well as physical needs, and are periodically adjusted to reflect
changing norms and mores. Between adjustments, of course, they
function just like fixed budgets, and so are close cousins to
strictly absolute definitions of poverty. They also share the
68 arbitrariness of the fixed budget standard.
A different intermediate choice comes much closer to
the purely relative concept of poverty: define the poor as
those families with incomes below X%ofthe median. Fuchs
(1967) suggested such a standard with x=50. While this
definition allows the poverty population to shrink or expand
jrincip1e, inracticeithas amounted to defining the poor
69 as the lowest 20%. Thus no definition of poverty is
unobjectionable.57.
Arelated set of points is worth making here. If
we are to enumerate the poor, we must decide what types of
recipient units to count (families? persons?), we must select
a definition of income, and we must pick an accounting period.
This all sounds familiar. The issues and problems are exactly
the same as in our lengthy discussion of income inequality--and
so is the sensitivityof the poverty count to the choices we
make. Official poverty counts, it should be noted, are based
on Census income- -a concept which, we have seen, apparently
hides an upward trend (of uncertain amount) in the share
of the bottom fifth. The demographic shifts studied earlier
are also worth recalling, since many of them have served to
increase the poverty population under official definitions.
Finally there is the accounting period. Official poverty counts
make no attempt to distinguish those who are permanently poor
from those who are temporarily poor (owing, for example, to a
large capital loss).70 Given the amount of mobility that has
been found atthelower end of the income distribution, this
maybe an important problem.
Who Are the Poor?
Having said all this, let us see who the official data
classify as poor. According to the latest data (for 1977),
9.3%ofallfamilies and 22.6% of all unrelated individuals
fellbelow official poverty lines. Persons in families constituted
about 807° of the poor, and almost half of these were in families58.
headed by a female--a femaleheadship ratio far higher than
that for the population as a whole. Thepoverty rate was only
5.5%formale-headed families, but 32% for female-headed
families. Among poor unrelatedindividuals, almost two-thirds
were female.71 Relative to the populationas a whole, the
poor were also more frequently black, less educated, and lived
in larger families.72
Alternative definitions of income orconcepts of
poverty give rather different poverty counts, however.Table 20,
for example, shows how the fraction ofpersons classified as
poor changes as we adjust either the incomeconcept or the
definition of poverty. Theupper lefthand entry is the official
poverty count for 1976: just under 12 percent of allpersons
were considered poor. A relativepoverty definition73 raises
the count to l.1Io of the population--a3O7 increase in the
number of poor people. Altering the definitionof income by
deducting direct taxes, adding income inkind, and correcting
for underreporting (which, weknow, is very serious for transfer
income) cuts the poverty count drastically--toonly 6 1/2/0
flyty_Counts
How has the poverty count behavedthrough time?
Figure 6 plots four different estimates. Theofficial data,
using Census income and an absolute definitionof poverty,
show rapid progress againstpoverty from 1959 (when the data
begin) until about 1969. Thereafter, the fractionof families
who are classified as poor almost levels off (itis 9.7%inTable 20
The Poverty Count for 1976,
by Different Definitions
(percent of all persons)
Census
Income
Official poverty lines 11.8
Relative poverty
standardb 15.li.
Census Income Census Income
6.5 21.0
NA 21i..1
Source: Danziger, Havernan, arid Plotnick (1979), Table 5,p.31.
8Adjusted for income in kind (both transfers and otherwise),
direct taxes, and underreporting by Smeeding (1977).























1969and9.310in1977), while the fraction of 3ane1ated
individualsso classifiedcontinues to tumble. The other
two series use persons as the recipient unit, andare
available only since 1965 (and not forevery year). There is
no discernible trend in relative poverty based on Censusmoney
income. bsoLute poverty based on income adjusted fortaxes,
in-kind income, and underreporting does show a downwardtrend,
though fluctuations are severe.
The conclusion, then, seems to run something like
this. The official poverty count declined smartlythrough the
1960s, but has been stagn'ant since then. This constancy, however,
isdue to the dominant position of families in theaggregate;
the incidence of poverty among unrelated individuals continued
to fall.If we fix up some of the pitfalls with Census income,
there appears to have been c.nsiderab1y moreprogress in the
Waron Poverty. But if we adopt a relative poverty concept
rather than the official poverty lines, there has been much
less.
One final word seems in order. Whether we use official
poverty lines or a relative poverty concept, Table 20 shows
that many fewer people are poor after (cash) transfers than
beforetransfers. The trends in pre- and post-transfer poverty
are also quite different. Byofficialdefinitions, the poverty
ratefor all persons declined 2t.i-10 between.l965 and 1976.
But, there is alnost no trend in the poverty rate based on
income minus (cash) transfers.7 Transfers, in a word, have
been the chief weapon in the War on Poverty.60.
B.Black-White Income Differentials'6
It is, of course, well-known that nonwhite individuals
andfamilies typically have lower incomes than whites.For
example, the ratio of mean income among nonwhite families and
unrelated individuals (Ulls) to thatamong whites averaged
.89(withstandard deviation .057)forthe postwar period as
a whole.
However, there was a substantial narrowing of the
differential during the period. Figure 7 charts the behavior
of the nonwhite/white income ratio since l9L1.7, for families
and UI's pooled. The upward trend from .52 in 191VT to .68
in 1975 is clear and unmistakable, though there
has been some slippage since then. The gains scored by
blacks between 196 and l68 are particularly iinpressive.7
The economic position of blacks relative to whites is
far from uniform across different demographicgroups. In 1977,
for example, the black/white mean income ratiowas .63 when
averaged over all families. But for families with a head aged
18-2L., it was .97 while for families headed by a year
old it was .57. Similarly, the ratio was .76 for male-headed
families versus .6I. for female-headed families.
Several demographic forces limited the economic gains
achieved by blacks, however. First, there wasa substantial
increase in the fraction of families headedby females--which
rose from 28° in 1967 to 37% by 1976.78 Second, the labor








85/oin1951 to 71% in 1977, with much of the drop accounted
for by the elderly.79 This occurred despite an increase in
black earning rates relative to those of whites.However,
relativeearnings gains were greater for women than for men.
Indeed, something close to full parity between the races was
achieved among females working full-time full-year. Theblack/
whiteearnings ratio for such workers rose from .56 in 1955
to .93 in 1977.80
Thus the improvement in the black/white income ratio
was the net result of a confluence of forces, some of which
were equalizing and some of which were disequalizing. On
balance, however, there can be no question that the relative
economic position of blacks improved substantiallyduring the
postwar years. Equally clearis the fact that--except in isolated
instances--parityhas not yet been achieved.
C. Male-Female Income Differentials
When we come to consider income differentials between
men and women(or between male- and female-headed families)
a ratherdifferent picture emerges. As Figure 8 shows, the
ratio of female to male incomes dropped from )-i.8%just after
World War II to only tOio by 1960, hovered in anarrow range
between 1.O/o and l4iYo between 1960 and 1969, and rose in
recent years to ju/0
Part of this huge income differential--which is wider
than that between blacks and whites- -isdue to the fact that
more women than men work part time or for only part of eachyear.. .-
.... . .
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But Figure 8 shows that even women who worked full time for a
full year typically had incomes only about 5U/oaslarge as those of
their male counterparts. (Earnings differentials show much
the same pattern. )Differentialsin incomes between male- and
female-headed families paint an even more pessimistic picture.
Female-headed families averaged 73'°of the income of male-headed
families in 1917, but only 50t70in1977. Indeed, as Lampman
(1977) has remarked, the lack of progress in narrowing male-female
differentials is almost unique in a period when black-white,
North-South and other differentials were being reduced. The
sharp increase in female labor force participation rates
suggests itself as the leading explanation of this lack of
progress, although that just raises another question: why did
female participation rates rise so much?81
i_Jfl9,
This section seeks to remedy some of the omissions
caused by the myopic concentration thus far on income as the
measure of well-being. The discussion is necessarily less
systematic, less quanbitative, and more impressionistic than
the discussion of income.
A. Leisure Time
When an economist is asked to go beyond income as a
measure of economic well-being, the first thing he thinks of
is leisure. (Indeed, this is often also the la thing he63.
thinksof.) It would seem that if two individuals have the
same wage rate82 but earn different incomes because they
voluntarily work different hours, then the best first guess
is that they are equally well off.Income inequality that
arises from voluntary choices between work and Leisure, then,
• ft ,83 isnot to be considered a social bad.
Leisure time can be expanded in several ways. The
number of hours worked per week can shrink.8 The number of
(fuiltime equivalent) weeks per year can decline because of
longer vacations and more paid holidays. Or the number of years
ofretirement,can be increased. As we shall see, each of these
factors has been operative during the postwar period.I
beginwith hours of work.
HoursofWork Per Week
Itis, of course, well known that the work week has
shrunk over the long sweep of history. Indeed, the extent of
this shrinkage is often exaggerated. We have probably all
heard stories about how a work week of six or seven 12-hour
days was "typicalT' around the turn of the century. But the
data belie these grisly tales. The average manufacturing worker
at the turn of the century apparently worked about six 10-hour
days per week--an average work week of 9hours.8 Hours outside
ofmanufacturingwere typically shorter yet, so the average
• 86 worker in all industries worked only 53 hours. From 1900
to 19L7 therewas a steady downward trend in the average work
week among manufacturing workers, which reached hours by6L.
Itis often claimed that the decline in the typical
work weekended around World War II, and that since then
Americanworkers have taken their increased leisure in the form
of fewer weeks per year. This widely-held view derives from
looking only at hours per week injtianufacturing, which by 1977
accountedfor just 2I° of total employment. Here the decline
inthe work week did indeed halt: it was 1O.3 hours long in
1977. But more than three-quarters of the U.S. labor force
worksin other industries; and in these industries the decline
in the average work week has continued throughout the
postwar period (see Table 21).I conclude that American workers
decreased their average work week by about lOi° during the
postwar period. Manufacturing workers (a shrinking minority)
were a notable exception.
Weeks of Work Per Year
Data are scarcer for the number of work weeks (or
days) in a year. Lebergott (1976, p. 91) reports that the
percent of nonfarm workers taking vacations increased from nearly
zero in 1930 to 60% in 190 and 8o/° in 1970. He also cites BLS
data that the typical American worker had 7 paid holidays.
While we do not know this for a fact, it is not hard to imagine
that the spreading incidence of vacations and paid holidays
mayhave reduced the typical work year by 2 weeks (about lo)
ormore.Table 21
Average Weekly Ho'rs in Selected
Industries, to l97
All Private Wholesale and
l97 14.0.3
197 36.0 3.6 32.8
Sc: 199, Table B-3, p. 22k.65.
Incidence of Retirement
another remarkable development of the postwar period
has been the increasing prevalence of retirement, especially
for men.88 The labor force participation rate for men 6
years of age and older fell from 11.7.8% in 19t1.7 to only 20.1/°
in 1977; for men aged 55_6.1., the decline was from 89.6/° to
71O89 Reimers (1976) compared men who reachedage 65around
1933 with men who reached age 6 around 1963 and concluded
that the younger generation devoted about 2 percent fewer years
of its life to work than did the older generation.
It takes more than a little chutah to combine this
guesstimate with my seat-of-the-pants estimate that more
vacations decreased the work year by about LI.tY°, and with data
showing a 107° decline in the average work week. But, if we
do all this, we are led to conclude that working time over a
typical career has decreased about 16'/° during the postwar period.
While this is a substantial amount, it probably means that
leisure time expanded more slowly than the consumption of
market goods and services.90 Evidence that leisure time is a
luxury good is lacking.
Housework
There is, however, one other important aspect of
declining work effort that ought not escape our attention.
Lebergott (1976) has estimated that the typical housewife spent
about 12 hours on housework per day in 1900, but only 5 hours66.
in1966. Stafford aridDuncan(1977) cite data from timediaries
showing that married women spent about 27 hours per week on
work in the home. How much of this decline in the housewife's
work day took place since World War II is not known. But if
we attribute half of the 8-hour-per-day decline to the postwar
period, then the postwar decline in the work day for housewives
would be about O/o.Thismay be an overestimate,91 but it
does seem that housewives have improved their lot relative to
paid workers in the pcstwar period.92 Family leisure thus
probably increased faster than leisure time of the principal
breadwinner.93
The Valuation of Leisure
much is this increasing leisure worth? There
seemto be two basic approaches to the valuation of leisure
time, though each has many variants. The first approach tacitly
orexplicitly posits a utility function that combines both
income (or consumption) and leisure time into a composite measure
ofwell-being.The major alternative is to convert leisure
timeinto money by using themarket wage. While
the utility-function approach is obviously
conceptually superior, it faces one (insurmountable?) problem:
ho knows what the rightutility function is?
The Distribution of Leisure and_Income
What of the distribution of leisure time? Morgan and
Smith(1969), using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,67.
founda slight negative correlation between leisure and income,
but a slight positive correlation between leisure and the ratio
of income to "needs.t' Sirageldin (1969) constructed a distribution
of economic well-being based on leisure and the ratio of income
to "needs" for data from the Productive Americans Survey. He
found that well-being so defined was distributed more equally
than income. Taussig (1973) valued leisure at the wage, using
data from the Survey of Economic Opportunity, and obtained
very simi]ar results. "Full income" was slightly more equally
distributed than money income. Browning (1976) and Browning
and Johnson (forthcoming) made two different adjustments for
non-working time, and found very substantial equalizing effects.
The conclusions seem o be, therefore, that
(a) leisure is distributed somewhat more equally
than income;
(b)leisure has a slight negative correlation with
income;
(c)more comprehensive measures.of economic well-being
thatinclude both leisure and income are distributed more
equally than income alone.
Involuntary_"Lsure"
Having said this, we must not ignore the fact that
not all "leisure" time is taken voluntarily. A person who is
disabled or involuntarily unemployed does, not want to "buy"68.
allthe leisure he gets at the going wage rate. For him, the
wage clearly overestimates the marginal value of leisure time.
While there is no satisfactory way at present to decompose
unemploymenttime into vo1untaryTT and "involuntary"components,
it is at least worth pointing out that the incidence of total
unemployment is highly uneven. The young, the black, and the
female suffer most from unemployment. Involuntary leisure seems
concentratedatthe lower end of the income distribution. It
ishard (for me at least) toimagine that this pattern is
entirely the result of free choice.
B. Wealth
In purchasing the goods and services from which they
derive satisfaction, people are not restricted to their current
income if they have accumulated wealth on which they can draw.
So,if our real concern is with the distribution ofeconomic
eli-being, dataon the distribution of wealth are a valuable
supplementto data on the distribution of income.9
Sources of Data
We know far less about the distribution of wealth in
the United States than about the distribution of income.
Certainly nothing comparable to the annual CPS exists for wealth.
Whatmeager knowledgeof the wealth distribution we have comes
fromthree sources.
First,there have been a few surveys of wealthholding,
ofwhich the Survey of Financial Characteristicsof Consumers
(SFCC) for 1962 (Projector and Weiss, 1966) is undoubtedly the
best. But these surveys have been sporadic, scattered through69.
time, and noncomparable; so they tell us little about trends
in wealth inequality. In addition, it is apparentlyvery
hard to elicit accurate data on wealth holding fromsurvey
respondents: even the assiduously planned and executed SFCC
was plagued by underreporting.96 Nonetheless, the SFCC data
on the wealth distribution in 1962 is undoubtedly the best
"snapshot" information we have.
Second, estimates of the wealth distribution have
been made by the estate multiplier method. Briefly, this
methodinvolves treating individuals who die in a part icu lar
year as arandomsample (perhaps after some adjustments) of
thosewho were living in that year. Then estate tax records
on the wealth of decedents can be used to infer the distribution
of wealth among the iiving.9 However, since only estates
above a certain amount (which for many years was 6O,OOO'
are required to file tax returns, the estate multiplier method
can yield information only about the extreme upper tail of the
wealth distribution.
Finally, a clever investigator can piece together scraps
of information from which he can create an estimate of the
distribution of wealth (Lebergott, 1976). While
this technique may be promising, it involves
considerable judgment and perhaps some guesswork in piecing
together disparate pieces of information, making time series
comparisons very difficult.70.
The stylized facts of the wealth distribution in the
postwar United States are allegedly as follows:
1.Inequality in the wealth distribution far exceeds
that in the income distribution.
2.There is no noticeable trend inwealth inequality.
Qualitatively,fact 1 rests on a fairly secure base;
but we remain uncertain of its quantitative dimensionsowing to
the paucity of data. The SFCC found the Gini coefficient for
wealthto be .76, as compared to a Gini. ratio for income in the
same population of •3•98 Lansing and Sonquist (1969, p. 50)
epofted Gini ratios forwealthwithinage cohorts in the 1953
and1962 Surveys of Consumer Finances ranging from .62 to
Feldstein (1976), however, has pointed out that these wealth
data exclude an important source of wealth which is both very
large in the aggregate and very equally distributed: the
discounted present value of future social security benefits.
Whenheadded estimates of this "social security wealth" to
the fungible wealth of those consumer units in the SFCC with
heads between 35 and 61s. yearsof age, the Gini ratio dropped
from.72 to .51. The top 1'°of wealthholders held 28.Y/°
of fungible wealth, but only 18.9% of total wealth. This
adjustment, as dramatic as it is, does not overturn the
conclusion that wealth is more unequally distributed than income.
George Stigler (1973) once asked in another context,
"Is this fact in fact a fact?" Our second "fact" may not be.71.
Whatweknow from estate multiplier estimates by Lampman (1962)
andSmith and Franklin (1971s.) is that the share of thevery,
very wealthy fell somewhat between the 1920s and the 191i.Os, and
has been relatively constant since then. Thus the alleged
stability of the wealth distribution is based on the experience
of the tg j2J°(orat best the top 1%).It hardly needs to
be stated that the lower 991/2° mighthave had a different
experience. Furthermore, Feldstein (1976) has pointed out that
the explosive growth of (very equally distributed) social
security wealth doubtless imparted some equalizing trend to the
wealth distribution.
This look at the wealth distribution was motivated
by a need to supplement information on income inequality. For
this purpose, however, we need to know the joint distribution
of income and wealth across individuals. Onlysurvey data can
give us this information. The SFCC data show a strong positive
correlation between income and wealth,10° which can hardly be
cons idered surprising.
The most natural way to combine the distributions of
wealth (a stock) and income (a flow) is to add the annuity
value of net worth to Census money income, and then subtract
current property income to avoid double-counting. Weisbrod
and Hansen (1968) did approximately this in combining the SFCC
with the 1962 CPS, but were forced to merge the two datasources
in a very crude way. They found that the Gini ratio of.37
for Census income became .2 when the annuity value of net
worth was added at a k% interest rateand .17whena io%72.
interest rate was used. Taussig (1973) combined income and
net worth information from the same data source, using a 6/°
interest rate, and found that the Girii ratio was almost unchanged
unless substantial corrections were made for underreporting of
net worth. After those corrections, the Gini ratio rose from
.361 to .393. Taking account of the distribution of wealth
thus seems to increase the degree of inequality.
Whatever benefits the extended family may have brought
to its members, they came at a cost of increasing household
congestion and loss of privacy. And,apparently, Americans in
the postwar period prized the reduced congestion and increased
privacy more than the benefits of the extended family. Data
onthe rapid growth ofthe number of unrelated individuals--
especiallyyoungand old people living alone--were cited
earlier in this chapter (see pages 00-00). Table22 offers
furtherdata on this subject.
The Census Bureau defines a subfarniaseither a
marriedcouple (with or without children), or a single parent
with one or more unmarried children, living in the same household
as another family to which they arerelated. The number of
subfamniliessodefined thus seems a good indicator of thenumber
ofextended families, though single grandparents would not be
counted as subfamilies. Part A of Table 22 shows that the
absolute number of subfamilies fell by almost two-thirds between
19LV7and1977.101 In l9J7, almost 910 of primary families hadTable 22
Selected Data on Living Apart
and Privacy, 191i.0-1970
A. Data on Subfarniliesa
NuntherofSubfamilies (millions)Ratio of Subfarnilies
YearAll Husband-Wife Other to_PrimaFamilies
1911.02.06 1.55 0.52 .065
1911.7 3.12 2.33 0.79
1977 1.18 0.51 0.67 .02].
B.Data on Married CQ,j1eswithout Own Household




C. Data on Secondary Farniliesb
Nuniber of Secondary Families (millions)Ratio of Secondary Fai1ie
AllHusband-Wife Other to Primary Fariilies
1911.00.68 0.11.0 0.28 .021
1911.70.83 0.60 0.23 .021i.
1977 0. 111. 0.03 0.21 .0011.
cal Statistics, p. 11.1, series A28-A3l9 ;
Series P-20, No. 313, Table 5.
aDefined as "a married couple withor without children, or one parent
with one or more unmarried children under 18 yearsold, living in a householdand related to, but not including, the head of the household
or his wife."
bDefined as "two or morepersons such as guests, lodgers, or resident
employees and'their relatives, living in a household and related
to each other."73.
another related family living with them. By 1977, this fraction
was down to barely over •Furthermore,about three-quarters
of these subfarnilies in l917 included bothparents, whereas by
1977 less than half of all subfamilies had two
parents. Data in Part B on the number and frequency of married
couples living in the household of some other family (not
necessarily a related family) tell a similar story.
A phenomenon related to living apart from relatives isthe
decline in the number of boarders and lodgers in Americanhouseholds
'--livingapartfrom non-relatives. According to dataput together
byLebergott (1976), the percentage of urban households with a
boarder or lodger decreased from 2 °in1900to 1- /0 in 191l and to
only 2'°in1970. The lodger, in other words, almost disappeared
from the scene during thepostwar period.
Data germane to this phenomenon appear inPart C of Table 22
TheCensus defines a "secondary family" astwo or more persons
relatedto one another but not related to the primary family. This
category includes guests, lodgers, or resident emoloyees; but since
singleindividuals are not counted as secondary families, most
lodgersareexcluded in this count. Nonetheless, as many as 2 1/2%
of primary families shared their homes with such an unre1aed
secondary family in l97.Almost none did by 1970.
D.Health
it willnotbe considered heretical to assert that, at equal
levelsof consumption and leisure, healthier people are better off.
And it i uite clear that the health of the Anerican pecple has
improved considerably during the postwar period.Perhaps the most useful summary statistic representing the
state of health is life expectancy. Table 23 displays data on life
expectancies at birth and at age 20. The increase in life
expectancy at birth was quite dramatic over the three decades, though
progress in this regard for men ceased around 1955. However, as
Part B suggests, a good deal of the improvement for men came in the
reduction of infant and child mortality. The life expectancy of a
man reaching aduicnooair.creaeuonly21/2 years trom 19Z1.0 to 1970
and has been virtually unchanged since 1955. (For women, however,
life expectancies have continued to imorove.)1By contrast, infant
mortality in 1970 was less than half what it was in 190.103
Mortality and morbundity from many, but not all, serious




Notall indicators of well-being are pointing upward. As
Table 25 shows, the postwar period has witnessed a stunning increase
in the incidence of illegitimate children, a surge in the divorce
rate, and little or no progress against suicide. Furthermore, crime
has been one of our biggest growth industries. There is little cause
for cheer in any of this.
"Early to bed, early to rise, makes a man health, wealthy,
and wise." This rhyme, I suppose, is meant to be a formula for
happiness. Americans, we have seen, are indeed considerablyTable 23
Changes in Life Expectancy,a 19O-197O











Change 1911.0-1970 +2.5 +6.0
Source: HistoricalStatistics,SeriesB108 -109,B118-119,
pp.55-56.








SelectedData on Illness and
Disease, 19tL0-l3'0
YearTuberculosis Syphilis Male ne
19h0 78.0 359.7 59.2





ç: Historical Statistics,SeriesB1).9-166and B291-30, pp. 8
and 77.
aData pertain to 1950.
S e lected Diseases
Influenza Malignant Cardiovasc ___- LEL_eUflcDLabetesNeg1asms Renal DiseaE
l11..Ii 70.3 26.6 120.3 11.85.7
0.2 30.9 18.9 162.8 11.96.0Table 25
Changes in Selected Social Indicators
Illegitimate Divorce Suicide Crime
Year Birth Ratea Rateb RateC ____
19b.0 7.1 8.8 lli..li 88.9
1955 19.3 9.3 10.2 79.8/83.5
1970 26. lli..9 11.6 271..7
live births per 1,000 married females.
Series B29, p. 52.
Divorcesper 1, 000 married fema les 15years old and over.
Source:Eiszorical Statistics, Series 3217, p. 6..
CSuicides per 100,000 population. 2U.: Historical Statistics, Series 3166, p. 8.
dcrimes known to policeper 1,000,000 population. o series are spliced here. The righthand series pertains to the entire
U.S., and the number reported for 1955 is actually for 1957.
The leftharid series pertains to urban areas only and is
constructed by the author from separate data on urban crimes
andurban pooulation. (Urban population for 1955 is interpolated between the 1950 and 1960 censuses.) Source: Historical Statistic,
Series H952 and H962, p. i.l3 and Series A57, p. 11.75.
wealthier and healthier than they were Oyears ago. They are
also better educated.l0 Are theyhappier?
This is not the sort of questionan economist feels
comfortablewith--and with good reason. Nonetheless,a provocative
paper by Easterlin (l97li) attempted to answer this questionby
studying opinion-poll data on people's self-proclaimedhappiness.
Easterlin's findings for the United States areeasily summarized.
At a given point in time, happiness seemsclearly to increase
with economic status. However, as we lookover time, there is
little if any upward trend in happinessdespite noticeable
improvements in the average standard of living.
These findings suggest one of two things. Either
"happiness" is a relative concept which depends (only)on each
person's situation relative to his peers, or that, regardless
of howhappypeople really are in an absolute sense, they tend
toanswer a survey questionlike this by rating their happiness
relativeto their contemporaries. There isprobably no operational
way of distinguishing between these two competing hypotheses,
thoughthey are different. For example, if we compare a family
with income of 18,261. in 1977 and one withp3,5146 in 19Is7
(the means for the two years), the firsthypothesis states that
they are equally happy while the second hypothesis states that
the 1977 family is happier on an absolutescale, but no more
happy on a relative scale--and responds to the questionerby
reporting on relative happiness. I personally find the
latter interpretation more appealing.76.
"Whenuse a word.. .itmeans just what I
choose it to mean--neither more nor less."
--LewisCarroll
We have seen in this essay that, according to the
official data, average incomes generally have been rising
during the postwar period while income inequality has been
relatively Canwe accept these "facts" at face value?
Whatwelfareimplications, if any, follow from them?
The data show that per capita income and consumption
increased roughly 80% in real terms between 19!-7 and 1977.In
addition to consuming mare of most goods and services, Americans
changed their patterns of consumption markedly. For the most
part, these redirections of spending seem recognizable as
improvements in the quality of life.in addition, longevity
and health improved, leisure time expanded, and privacy increased.
Yet over the same period a number of social indicators (e.g.,
divorce, illegitimacy, crime) signal a deterioration in the
quality of life, and people report themselves no happier than
30 years ago. What are we to make of all this? Must we abandon
the use of income as a measure of well-being?
My own impression is that we need not. For one thing,
our main use of income as a guage of well-being is cross-
sectional, and it still seems reasonable to view people with
higher incomes as "better off" at any moment in time--despite77.
some anamolies. Second, even looking acrosstime, my guess
is that rising average income does indeedimprove the human
lot--though perhaps not by as much as the datasuggest. Various
non-incomeaspects of well being, such as leisure timeand health,
may not grow as rapidly as material consumption; growthmay
produce a variety of well-known disarnenities (pollution,
congestion,
etc.); and we should not entirely ignore themessage that
"happiness"is perhaps a relativisticconcept. While itwould
bepresumptuoustocDncluc5e that people are 8010 "better off"
now than they were in l9t.7, it seems preposterous toconclude
that they are no better off.
_ajsi.g.1iyandEconornicweig
Thingsget quite a bit murkier when we turn our attention
to the trend (or lack thereof) in incomeinequality. During
the postwar period, a number ofstrong, and seemingly autonomous,
forces pushed income inequality higher.10 Theseinclude:
*a shifting age distribution that left the1977 economy
with relatively more old andyoung (and thus lower-paid)
members than the l9li.7 economy;
*an increasing incidence of female headship of
families106
*changes in living arrangements that produced more
low-income units as extended families brokeup, fewer families
took in lodgers and boarders, and moreyoung and old people
formed their own households.78.
In brief, when we look at the U.S. economy from l9i.7
to 1977, we are not looking at a society unchanging in
composition by age, sex, and family structure. And most of
the demographic changes that occurred were the sort that produce
greater inequality, given our measurement procedures. Two
conclusionsfollow. First, if we could measure the income
distribution at fixed demography, a trend toward equality would
emerge--a trend that the official data mask. Second, most of
the factors that served to increase inequality during the
postwar period do not signify deteriorationsin economic
well—being. Indeed, the opposite seems more likely. Measured
income inequality thus seems an unreliable indicator of
economic welfare.
Despite these and other disequalizing factors, the
overall income distribution--as measured--did not become more
unequal. The main reasons seem to have been a variety of
government redistributive activities, including:
*the rapid growth of cash transfers which, we have
seen, have been the principal weapon in the Waron Poverty;
*the equally rapid growth of transfers in kind, which
are not included in the official data (another reason why the
official data understate the trend toward equality);
*other programs such as affirmative action guidelines,
equal opportunity and anti-discrimination laws, and the like.
These programs have not been dealt with in this chapter because
we lack estiroatos of their effects on income inequality.10779.
But I would be remiss not to suggest a possible link between
these governmental activities and the observed narrowing of
black/white income differentia is.
It appears that, on balance, these competing sets of
factors--demography versus government--battled to a standoff.
Income inequality, as measured in the official data, wasunchanged
between 1911.7 and 1977. But I would not want to push theanalogy
to a tug-of-war too far, because there is reason to suspect
that the two sides were not independent. Specifically,government
programs designed to equalize post-tax post-transfer incomes
may well have helped disequalize pre-tax pre-transfer incomes.
For example:
*It has often been suggested that redistributive tax
and transaer schemes have disincentive effects that,e.g.,
discourage labor supply among beneficiaries (thepoor, the
elderly, etcj.108
*It is conceivable, though here we know much less,
that transfer programs such as AFDC and social securitymay
have contributed to some of the changes in family structure and
living arrangements that were just labeled as disequalizing
factors (e.g., increases in female headship, moreelderly
people living alone, etc.).
*It is quite possible that expenditures on public
education (an apparently "equalizing" transfer in kind)were
among the factors leading to the more pronounced age-income
profile- -thus contributing to a growing gap between annual
and lifetime inequality.80.
No wonder, then, that in the wonderland of inequality:
•. . ittakes all the running you can do,
to keep in the same place. If you want to
getsomewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as thatF-i.
FOOTNOTES
1Fora detailed treatment of postwar demographic changes,
see the chapter by Richard Easterlin in this volume.
2For an extensive discussion of opportunity sets, see
Gordon (1977).
3Conversely, two people with equal incomes may have
gotten there from very different opportunity sets.
Even the CPS data are notperfectly consistent over
time. Minor changes in definitions, survey techniques, etc. have
been made. For a more detailed discussion and critique of the
Census income concept, see Taussig (1977).
50n this, see Lebergott (1976,pp. 11-12) or Rivlin (197).
6For more detailed technical discussions of thisissue,
the interested reader is referred to Atkinson (1970), Sen (1973),
or Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973).
7Readers familiar with the Gini ratiomay skip the
rest of this section, which is a nontechnical explanation for lay
readers.
8By the formula for the area of a triangle, this area
is always 1/2.
9But not all, as a well-knownpaper by Budd (1970)
established.F-2.
full account of these recessions can be found in
the paper by Robert Gordon in this volume.
11Defined specificallyas personal income plus retained
earningsplus contributions for social insurance (both employee's
and e:oloyer's shares).
l2Definedspecifically asdisposable income (as in the
NIA)plus retained earnings, or alternatively as augmented personal
incoreminus contributions for social insurance minuspersonal
tax and nontax payments.
deflationis done using the implicit deflator for
personal consumption expenditures.
lithardly needs pointing out that the national income
accounts measure nominalinterest,not real interest. The share
ofinterest has risen mainly because there is trend in the inflation
rate.
Age of the housing stock refers toprivate nonfarm
reside-.tial structures containing from 1tounits. The increase
intheincidence ofrunningwater and flush toilets came largely
inruralareas.
l6Absolute pricesrose only 15% over30years, which
implies that relative prices fell 5710 .
1Inl9O, there were 2,l2,O0O private household workers
and-.9,0oohouseholds. By 1970, the number of private household
'.;orkershadfallenslightlyto 2,3!7,0OO, while the number ofF-3.
householdshad risen to 63,LO1,000. :stics,
Series D-567 and A-288.
procedure the Commerce Department does not follow.
Ihave taken several liberties with their way of organizing the
data.
category also includes radios, musical instruments,
and records.
20For detailed discussions of this topic, see Taussig
(1977) and Danziger (1977).
21The incomeconcept underlying this table differs from
Censusincome, and so these distributions are not directly comparable
to those in Table 9.
22Table 11 pertains to families, and excludes unrelated
individuals.
similar calculation comparing the richest tenth and
the poorest tenth brings an apparent 1:1 ratio in the raw data
down to only 2.8:1.
214.misissuehas been stressed by Kuznets (1971-p),
among others.
25,discussionof this point is deliberately sketchy.
Forfurther details, see the chapter by Richard Easterlin in this
volume.
26Blinder and Esaki (1978) report detecting a statistically
significant break in the trend for several percentile shares
around 1958.F-I'..
regression was run with the Gini ratio as the
dependent variable, and the following independent variables:
theunemployment rate, a constant, a dummy variable which is 1
starting in 1958, time, and the interaction of time with the dummy.
The coefficient of time was -.0022 (with standard error .ooo).).
Thesum ofthe coefficients of timeand the interaction term,
whichis the post-198 time trend, was -QQQi(with standard
error .0017).
281na regression identical to that reported in the
previous footnote, the estimated time trend in the Gini ratio
among unrelated individua iswas -. 00l)-(standard error =.0013)
until and-.OOEO (standard error .0017) thereafter.
29Table 15 summarizes the whole distributionby the
Giniratio onlyto keep the volume of datamanageable.Inspection
ofthe urerlying distributions reveals, fortunately, that there
are hardy any instances of crossing Lorenz curves--the circumstance
that would render the Gini ratio potentially misleading. The few
Lorenz curve crossings that occur are indicated in footnotes to
Table l. The year l96 was selected for this table because it
comes closest to being a TttypicalT postwar year.
30The reader is reminded that, by Census definitions,
there are no one-person families.
3l will have more tosay on the subject of age and the
income dstribution when Idiscussthe accounting period, since
the problems arise largely from measuring income in a particular
year rather than over thelifetime.F-5.
32The section is limited to the family income distribution
both to save space and because most of the literature does the same.
33Let us be clear about what this simple adjustment does
not do.If we are interested in income as an indicator of well-beina,
as we are, then a proper "adjustment" for taxes and transfers
really requires resolution of every complex and controversial
issue in tax incidence theory. What portion of the value of any
transfer payment actually accrues to the recipient? What part
of the burden of a sales tax falls on the consumer of the product?
Can the income tax be shifted? It hardly needs saying that questions
like these are well beyond the scope of this chapter, and indeed
probably also beyond the scope of current economic knowledge.
My aim here is much more modest: to get the bookkeeping straight.
Specifically, subtraction of individual income tax oayments and
the employee's share of the payroll tax from Census income (the
employer's share is already excluded), is n meant to imply that
the burden of these taxes falls entirely on those who pay them.
Nor does the absence of any deduction for indirect taxes imply
that they are totally borne by firms.
exception is Smeeding (1979a), who also deducts
indirect taxes.
35Thistable is drawn from a detailed study of the 1972
distribution usingmicro data and the OBE income concept. The
findings correspond closely to those reported earlier by Budd(1967) for1962. Table 17 shows much less redistribution than
that implied by the data in Browning (1976).
6onthis,see Smeeding (1979a). Sales taxes are
usually viewed as regressive, but Browning (1978) argues that
they should be considered as progressive. Smeeding (1979c)
disagrees.
37Browning (1976) reaches a similar conclusion.
8According to Browning (1976), transfers in kind
(including public education) increased from 7.2°of Census income
tn 192 to 9/Oin1962 and 11..6To in 1972.
39For further discussion, see Smolensky et.al. (1977).
°Their justification, Ipresume, is either on some
externality argument or on grounds o paternalism.
1Smo1ensky etal. (1977) did not try to price out
public education by this method, which is difficult because the
market for private education is so thin and because public and
private education seem to be diffirent products.
volume and distribution of educational transfers
are apparently not in dispute.
See Smeeding (l979a,p. 911).
Lorenz curves for income before and after cash
transfers do not cross, so the Gini ratio is probably a
satisfactory summary statistic.Studies alluded to include
Danziger and Plotnick (1977), Tauss ig (l97 ),Smolenskyet.a.F-7.
(1977), and Garfinkel and Haveman (1978), and cover years ranging
from 1965to19711..
According to Browning and Johnson (forthcoming,
Table 1), in 1976 the lowest fifth of families (ranked by total
income) received 631°ofits income in the form of transfers.
6Smeeding (1979a) attempted an adjustment for
employerpension contributions but, as Browning (1979) pointed
out, was guilty of double-counting since Census income includes
income from pensions. In principle, we might want to include
either pension contributions when made or pension income when
received, but not both.
distribution assigned 68io of the gains to the
top fifth and 3%to the bottom fifth.
8Realcapital gains as a percentage of disposable income
varied from +38% in 1958 to _511.% in 1911.6. A regression of this
ratio against time produced a coefficient that was essentially
zero.
similar analysis can be found in Danziger (1977).
°Pagiin(1975).
51Forthe "typical" 3-5% reduction, see Benus and Morgan's
(1975) calculations for a 1968-1972 Office of Economic Opportunity
panel and for a special panel designed to study the impact of the
19611. income tax cuts; and Kohen, Parnes, and Shea's (1975) results
with the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of mature men. Earlier,
Vandome (1958) had reported similar results for the U.K.F-B.
52Benus and Morgan (1975) reported a 9/o reduction in
the Gini coefficient in a 1967-1970 panel study of purchases of
durable goods, and Kohen (1975) found a 107° reduction among
the NLS young men.
53Hoffman and Podder (1976).
1gain, see Hoffman and Podder (1976), who report
declines in several measures of inequality ranging from 13° to
21° when the accounting period is lengthened from one year to
seven years. David and Menchik (1979) find an even stronger
effect: the coefficient of variation declines LY/°when income
over 3 years is used instead of annual income.
55The coefficient of variation, a common measure of
dispersion, is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.
65o1tow's (1965) study of the distributional history
of the town of Sarpsborg, Norway from 1928 to 1960 found that
the 33-year Gini ratio was 27% lower than the average of the
1-year Gini ratios. Blomquist (1976) estimated that the Gini
ratio for lifetime income among employed males in Sweden was about
half as large as the Gini ratio for annual income.
57This classification follows Danziger, Havenian, and
Srnolensky (1977).
8The data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Technical
Report No. 17, and are not reproduced here.F-9.
59Figure 3 shows smooth curves fitted(by eye) to grouped
data. Each mean income is expressed as a fraction of the
income of families headed by a l.55liyearold.
6OFor criticisms ofPaglin's method, see Danziger,
Haveman, and Srnolensky (1977) and Minarik (1977).
61The thirdpart arises from the fact that the upper
part of the low-income groups have higher incomes than the
lower parts of the high-income groups. For a lucid explanation
ofPyatt '5decompositionand a discussion of how it relates to
Paglin's technique, see Murray (1978).




6For a fullerdiscussion, see Weinstein and Smolensky
(1976).
66Kilpatrick(1973) used Gallup poll surveys of minimal
income needs to argue that the man on the street'sconcept of the
poverty line rises with average income, though less than in strict
S
proportion.Lebergott (1976, pp. 53-60) collected data showing
that payments to poor on relief remained about 301° of thewage
for common labor for more than a century. See also Rainwater
(1971.), esp. Chapters 3 and 5.F-b.
6Based on the work ofOrshansky (1965).
68Lebergott(1976,pp. 70-76) has objected eloquently
to the "scientific" budgets that underly the minimum decency
ste nda rd.
Fuchs (1967), P. 89.
70This is no trivial problem. The CPS eachyear finds
a number of families with negtive income (and Census income
excludes capital losses). For example, in 1977 the mean income
among the 210 of families with incomes below 2,O00 was -l7O0.
One wonders how many families with negative income are "poor" in
any meaningful sense.
1CurrenplatjonReoorts Series P-6o, No. 119.
72Non-whites constituted 3)4% of all poor persons; among
heads of poor families, 6310hadnot finished high school; the
average family size was 3.67.SeeCurrent P22.ulation Rorts,
Series P-60, No. 119.
73The poor are those below Ii-)4l°of the median income.
These fluctuationsmay be due to inconsistencies in
estimation methods over time. See Plotnick and Smeeding (1979),
footnote 16.
T5Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1979), Table 5,p.31.
6For data on black-white enjg differentials,
see the chapter by Richard Freeman in this volume.F-li.
77The data pertain to"nonwhites," rather than to
blacks. However, blacks predominate in this group.
8versus 9''°and 11% for whitefamilies in the two years.
Data are from Danziger and Lampman (1978).
79Seethe chapter by Richard Freeman.
80The same ratio formen was also .6 in 1955,but
improved only to .69 in 1977. See Thurow (1979).
8lFreeman addresses this issue in hischapter in this
volume.
the same we1th. More on wealth later.
8The crucial words in theselast two sentences, of
course, are "voluntarily" and "voluntary." Not all interpersonal
differences in hours of work are voluntary. More on this below.
8Or therecan be more leisure tinie on the job. On
this, see Stafford and Duncan (1977).
8Historical Statistics. Thework week comes from
series D-765, p. 168; the work day is reported as 9.89 hours in
Series D-8I7, p. 172.
86MooreandHedges (1971).
8e older andnewer hours series are not entirely
comparable, though both display downward trends. The data series
cited in footnote8 ends in 1926, when average weekly hours are
50.3. The newer series used for postwar comparisons records a
value of l.5 for that same year.F-12.
88Gordon and Blinder (1979) explore reasons for
this phenomenon.
8Reimers (1976) shows that these data need not imply
that the mean age of retirement
hasdecreasedand she estimates that it has been fairly constant
at around 65 years. The reason is that there are fewer and fewer
people who never retire.
90Real consumption per capita rose about 8O°. The
percentage increase in leisure is the percentage in
working time multiplied by the initial ratio of work to leisure.
Iithatinitial ratio was two, for example,then leisure time
rose)2/0.
itis not clear that it is. Most of the work-
saving machinery that has helped the housewife became widespread
only after World WarII.
-
shouldbe noted, however,that housewives were
more overworked in 1900 than were paid workers. Housewives, it
seems,really did work theproverbial six or seven 12-hour days.
93Yet one more qualification. Women are spending far
more time in the paid work force than they used to. So the
reduction inhousework often may not representmoreleisure time.
1Taussig (1973) makes an attempt atthis.Browning
(1976) and Browning andJohnson(forthcoming) treat all non-working
time asvoluntaryleisure.F-13.
95Were the lifetime used as the interval for
measuring income, there would be little need for separate data
on wealth. The present value of income would differ from (human
plus nonhuman) wealth only to the extent that inheritances differ
(in present value) from bequests.
6rojector and Weiss (1966,p.61-62); Lebergott (1976,
pp. 217ff.).
97For a discussion of themethod, and examples of its
use, see Lampman (1962) or Smith (1971i.).
8rojector and Weiss (1966),p. 30.
99Since Gini coefficients within theseage cohorts
were .70-.71 in the SFCC, the agreement between the two sources
is close.
100Projector and Weiss (1966),pp. 6-7.
101Theyear1914.0 isincluded also to show the increase
in living together brought about by the war.
102The extent to which longevity has increased is often
exaggerated. Life expectancy at age 60 for males increased only
1.1 years over the entire 30-year period, and only 0.2 years from
1955 to 1970. Life expectancy for 60-year-old females, however,
increased by Ii.yearsbetween 1939-14.1 and 1970.
10320deaths per 1000 live births in 1970 versus 14.7
in 1914.0.F-hi..
l0ti..resist the temptation to equate education with
wisdom.
105
The word "autonomous" needs some explanation. I
donot mean to imply that these forces were God-given orexogenous
in some ultimate sense, but only that they probably were not
themselves effects of the changing income distribution.
lO6Among themany factors contributing toward this
development were higher divorce rates, more illegitimate births,
and changing social mores regarding the role of women. For a
u11 discussion, see Ross and Sawhill (1975).
10They are dealt with in the chapter by Richard Freeman
on the labor market.
possible counterweight to this isthat withdrawal
oflabor supply may push up the relative wages of thesegroups.R-1.
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